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THE BROKEN BUCK STOPS HERE: 
EMBRACING SPONSOR SUPPORT IN MONEY 
MARKET FUND REFORM* 
JILL E. FISCH** 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Reserve Primary 
Fund (“Reserve Fund”) “broke the buck,” money market funds 
(“MMFs”) have been the subject of ongoing policy debate. Many 
commentators view MMFs as a key contributor to the crisis 
because widespread redemption demands during the days 
following the Lehman bankruptcy contributed to a freeze in the 
credit markets. In response, MMFs were deemed a component of 
the nefarious shadow banking industry and targeted for 
regulatory reform. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(“SEC”) misguided 2014 reforms responded by potentially 
exacerbating MMF fragility while potentially crippling large 
segments of the MMF industry. 
Determining the appropriate approach to MMF reform has been 
difficult. Bank regulators supported requiring MMFs to trade at 
a floating net asset value (“NAV”) rather than a stable $1 share 
price. By definition, a floating NAV prevents MMFs from 
breaking the buck but is unlikely to eliminate the risk of large 
redemptions in a time of crisis. Other reform proposals have 
similar shortcomings. More fundamentally, the SEC’s reforms 
may substantially reduce the utility of MMFs for many investors, 
which could, in turn, affect the availability of short-term credit. 
The shape of MMF reform has been influenced by a turf war 
among regulators as the SEC has battled with bank regulators 
about the need for additional reforms and about the structure 
and timing of those reforms. Bank regulators have been 
influential in shaping the terms of the debate by using banking 
rhetoric to frame the narrative of MMF fragility. This rhetoric 
masks a critical difference between banks and MMFs—asset 
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segregation. Unlike banks, MMF sponsors have assets and 
operations that are separate from the assets of the MMF itself. 
This difference has caused the SEC to mistake sponsor support 
as a weakness rather than a key stability-enhancing feature. As a 
result, the SEC adopted reforms that burden sponsor support 
instead of encouraging it. 
As this Article explains, required sponsor support offers a novel 
and simple regulatory solution to MMF fragility. Accordingly, 
this Article proposes that the SEC require MMF sponsors 
explicitly to guarantee the $1 share price. Taking sponsor support 
out of the shadows embraces, rather than ignores, the advantage 
that MMFs offer over banks through asset partitioning. At the 
same time, sponsor support harnesses market discipline as a 
constraint against MMF risk-taking and moral hazard. 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 936 
I.  BACKGROUND .............................................................................. 942 
A.  The Structure of MMFs ......................................................... 942 
B.  The Reserve Primary Fund ................................................... 946 
C.  The SEC’s 2010 MMF Reforms ........................................... 950 
II.  THE CASE FOR FURTHER REGULATORY REFORM ................ 951 
A.  Concern that the 2010 Reforms Were Not Enough ............ 951 
B.  The Case for MMF Vulnerability ......................................... 957 
III.  THE 2014 REFORM ....................................................................... 963 
A.  The SEC’s 2014 MMF Rule .................................................. 963 
B.  Evaluating the Reforms ......................................................... 965 
1. The Floating NAV ........................................................... 966 
2. Gates and Fees ................................................................. 969 
3. The New Disclosure Requirements ............................... 973 
IV.  MANDATORY SPONSOR SUPPORT—A NEW APPROACH 
TO MMF REFORM ........................................................................ 979 
A.  A Proposal for Mandatory Sponsor Support ..................... 979 
B.  Advantages of Mandatory Sponsor Support over 
Current Law ........................................................................... 985 




On September 16, 2008, the Reserve Fund broke the buck. The 
Reserve Fund, which held $785 million in Lehman Brothers debt, 
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reduced its NAV1 to 97 cents per share after the announcement of 
Lehman’s bankruptcy filing caused the board to write down the value 
of the Lehman debt to zero.2 
By September 16, 2008, the financial markets had already 
experienced substantial turbulence. Contributing to this turbulence 
were the bailout of Bear Stearns,3 the federal government’s decision 
to put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship,4 the 
Federal Reserve Board’s announcement of its decision to support 
AIG financially,5 and the Lehman bankruptcy.6 Many MMF sponsors 
provided support to their MMFs to maintain the stable $1 share price 
by taking actions like buying debt holdings that had declined in 
market value.7 Nonetheless, over the next several days, investors 
redeemed substantial amounts of money from MMFs.8 According to 
the SEC, “During the week of September 15, 2008 [(“Lehman 
week”)], investors withdrew approximately $300 billion from prime 
[MMFs].”9 
 
 1. NAV is the net asset value of a share of an MMF. See Jill Fisch & Eric Roiter, A 
Floating NAV for Money Market Funds: Fix or Fantasy?, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003, 1008 
(explaining calculation of NAV). 
 2. Diya Gullapalli, Shefali Anand & Daisy Maxey, Money Fund, Hurt by Debt Tied 
to Lehman, Breaks the Buck, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122160102128644897.html. 
 3. See generally Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns’ Big Bailout, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-03-14/bear-
stearns-big-bailoutbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice 
(describing the terms of the bailout of Bear Stearns by the U.S. Government and 
JPMorgan Chase). 
 4. See generally Fed. Hous. Fin. Auth., FHFA As Conservator of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--Freddie-
Conservatorships.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2014) (explaining the decision of the Federal 
Housing Finance Authority (“FHFA”) to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
conservatorship on September 6, 2008). 
 5. The Federal Reserve issued a press release announcing this support at 9:00 PM on 
September 16, 2008. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 
16, 2008, 9:00 PM), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm 
 6. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on Lehman’s bankruptcy filing as well as the sale of 
Merrill Lynch to Bank of America). 
 7. Gullapalli, Anand & Maxey, supra note 2. 
 8. Div. of Risk, Strategy, & Fin. Innovation, Response to Questions Posed by 
Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 7 (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/money-market-funds-memo-2012.pdf [hereinafter SEC 
Staff Report]. The redemptions were concentrated in prime MMFs, which invest primarily 
in nongovernment securities such as commercial paper. A substantial percentage of the 
redeemed assets were reinvested in Treasury and government funds. See id. 
 9. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,834, 
36,843–44 (proposed June 19, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, 270, 274, 
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Widespread redemptions put more MMFs at risk of breaking the 
buck, but they also had a broader effect. Fund managers began to 
retain increased quantities of cash in their portfolios rather than 
continuing to invest in order to provide a liquidity cushion to meet 
the demands of further redemptions.10 Because MMFs form a 
substantial proportion of the buyers of commercial paper, repurchase 
agreements, and other types of short-term debt instruments, the 
withdrawal of capital reduced the availability of short-term credit.11 
Tightening credit conditions caused businesses to reduce capital 
expenditures and lay off workers.12 
Although the story of the Reserve Fund has ended in that its 
assets have been liquidated and distributed to investors,13 the effect 
has lingered on. Policymakers viewed the fragility of MMFs as a 
substantial cause of the financial crisis.14 Deemed a component of the 
nefarious shadow banking industry,15 MMFs were targeted for 
regulatory reform.16 The central goal of reform proposals was to 
prevent MMFs from breaking the buck in the future17 because of the 
 
& 279) [hereinafter 2013 Rule Proposal]. During the “Crisis Month,” which ran from 
September 2, 2008 until October 7, 2008, “prime fund assets fell by $498 billion (24 
percent).” SEC Staff Report, supra note 8, at 7. 
 10. See 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,844. 
 11. See Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, 
October 28-29, 2008, FED. RESERVE BD. 5, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ 
files/fomcminutes20081029.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2015). As the Federal Reserve noted, a 
substantial number of other economic factors adversely impacted the short-term credit 
markets during this time period. Id. at 3–4. 
 12. Id. at 8. 
 13. Investors in the Reserve Primary Fund ultimately collected more than 99 cents on 
the dollar. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1004. 
 14. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, SEC Missed Chance on Money Funds, Should Step Aside 
Now, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-02-25/sec-
missed-chance-on-money-funds-should-step-aside-now.html (“[MMFs] were at the heart 
of the 2008 financial crisis”). Arthur Levitt was Chair of the SEC from 1993 to 2000. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Sheila Bair, Beware of Money Market Funds, TIME MONEY (May 23, 
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/01/pf/money-market-funds.moneymag/index.html 
(warning of the dangers of MMFs as part of the “shadow banks”). Sheila Bair was Chair of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) from 2006 to 2011. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Cent. Banking Newsdesk, Fed’s Tarullo Calls for Prompt Action to Regulate 
Shadow Banking, CENTRALBANKING.COM (June 13, 2012), http://www.centralbanking.com/ 
central-banking/news/2184154/fed-s-tarullo-calls-prompt-action-regulate-shadow-banking 
(identifying greater regulation of MMFs as one of the immediate steps that regulators should 
take to address the shadow banking industry). 
 17. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 8, at 18. But cf. id. at 36–37 (concluding, based 
on Monte Carlo simulations, that the 2010 regulatory reforms would not have prevented 
the Reserve Primary Fund from breaking the buck); 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 
36,834, 36,848 (explaining that “[t]he RSFI Study concludes that the 2010 reforms would 
have been unlikely to prevent a fund from breaking the buck when faced with large credit 
losses like the ones experienced in 2008”). 
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concern that breaking the buck would generate “runs.” Regulators 
warned that these runs would produce contagion across MMFs 
generally and lead to systemic effects on the economy.18 As Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner explained: “[T]he financial crisis of 
2007–2008 demonstrated that MMFs are susceptible to runs and can 
be a source of financial instability with serious implications for 
broader financial markets and the economy.”19 
The dominant reform proposal was to require that MMFs move 
to a floating NAV rather than a stable $1 share price, which, by 
definition, would prevent funds from breaking the buck.20 Although 
bank regulators favored a floating NAV, members of the SEC were 
skeptical. In 2012, then-Chair Mary Schapiro attempted to adopt a 
rule requiring a floating NAV for all MMFs but was unable to 
persuade her fellow Commissioners to support the reform.21 Bank 
regulators increased their pressure subsequent to Schapiro’s 
announcement and, on July 23, 2014, the SEC adopted a compromise 
rule requiring a floating NAV only for institutional prime MMFs and 
implementing a variety of additional regulatory requirements for 
other MMFs, including a complex structure of gates and fees for retail 
MMFs.22 
Throughout the six-year debate, proposals for MMF reform have 
been widely unsatisfactory, and the SEC’s new rule is no exception.23 
The required floating NAV may eliminate the viability of prime 
MMFs as an investment option and reduce the size of the short-term 
credit markets in the future.24 At the same time, there are compelling 
 
 18. 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,848 (explaining that the RSFI study 
supports the conclusion that further regulatory reforms are necessary to address concerns 
over heavy redemptions and their potential contagion effects). 
 19. Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to Members of 
the Fin. Stability Oversight Council 1 (Sept. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Geithner Letter], available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/Sec.Geithner.Letter.To.FSOC.pdf. 
 20. See 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,849 (describing the proposal to require 
a floating NAV). 
 21. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Money 
Market Fund Reform (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/ 
PressRelease/1365171484078#.VSgRafnF_mc [hereinafter Schapiro Statement]. 
 22. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 
47,736 (Aug. 4, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279) [hereinafter 
2014 Final Rule]; see infra Part III (describing and evaluating the 2014 Final Rule). 
 23. See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, Mary Jo White Was Supposed to Turn Around the S.E.C. 
She Hasn’t, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/mary-
jo-white-was-supposed-to-turn-around-the-s.e.c.-she-hasnt (“After years of rule-making 
negotiations . . . the agency finally came up with a rule. But it’s a bad one.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Inv. Co. Inst. to the Fin. Stability Oversight 
Council 67 (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/13_fsoc_mmf_recs.pdf 
(explaining how a floating NAV would harm the short-term credit markets). 
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reasons to question whether retail funds could ever employ gates and 
fees without signing their own death warrants. Neither aspect of the 
reform responds in a meaningful manner to the problem of large 
redemptions in a time of financial distress.25 
The debate over money market reform goes further than the 
issue of how best to regulate a particular financial product. Situated at 
the crossroads of two powerful interest groups—banks and the 
mutual fund industry—MMF regulation illustrates a fault line in 
financial market regulation.26 The battle over MMF reform pitted the 
banking industry and its regulators against the SEC and the powerful 
Investment Company Institute (“ICI”).27 Both sides were cognizant of 
the stakes involved in the future of a $3 trillion industry.28 Reform 
was possible only because of the SEC’s vast concession to allow the 
operation of retail MMFs to proceed largely unchanged, a concession 
that divided the mutual fund industry and won the SEC the support 
of the large retail-oriented MMF sponsors including Schwab, Fidelity, 
and Vanguard.29 
Politics has pressured the SEC to take a flawed approach to 
MMF reform and to overlook a simple and superior regulatory 
solution. The rhetoric that describes MMFs as shadow banks and 
analogizes MMF redemptions to bank runs has obscured a critical 
structural difference between MMFs and bank accounts: the 
 
 25. See id. at 61 (“Where the Commission once appeared to have an unrealistic goal 
for money market fund reform—namely, eliminating any possibility of a run—there is now 
an acknowledgement that such a goal is impossible.”). 
 26. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at “The 
SEC Speaks in 2013” (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 
1365171492342#.U4Ypi6PD8-U (“Capital markets regulators and bank regulators have 
drastically different missions and oversee fundamentally different markets and market 
participants.”). The conflict also highlighted the ambiguous role of the newest financial 
regulator, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”), in overseeing policy 
decisions by other financial regulators. See id. (questioning efforts by FSOC to dictate the 
terms of MMF regulation). 
 27. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 14 (stating that the SEC would have adopted structural 
reforms but-for industry interference). 
 28. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,736–37 (reporting that, as of February 28, 
2014, MMFs collectively held over $3 trillion in assets). 
 29. See Trevor Hunnicutt, SEC Passes Money Fund Rules—but Wait, the Buck Could 
Still Break, INVESTMENT NEWS (July 23, 2014, 12:41 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/ 
article/20140723/FREE/140729961/sec-passes-money-fund-rules-but-wait-the-buck-could-
still-break (explaining that retail funds sold by firms such as Schwab, Fidelity, and Vanguard 
will be exempt from the “main thrust” of the MMF reforms). The big loser in the 
compromise was Federated, the third largest MMF sponsor, which offers primarily 
institutional prime MMFs. Christopher Condon, Federated Most Vulnerable to SEC Money 
Fund Proposals, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-
29/federated-most-vulnerable-to-sec-money-fund-proposals.html. 
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separation of MMF assets from the finances and operations of the 
MMF’s sponsor.30 The MMF sponsor is not a parent or affiliate of the 
fund but a separate legal entity that provides services to the MMF 
pursuant to an advisory contract.31 Unlike banks, MMF sponsors are 
legally independent from MMFs, and their assets are separate from 
the securities in the MMF’s portfolio.32 
This separation between the MMF and its sponsor allows 
sponsor support to mitigate fluctuations in the value of an MMF’s 
holdings and reduce the demand for redemption.33 Historically, 
sponsors have regularly provided financial support to prevent MMFs 
from breaking the buck, despite the fact that they have no legal 
obligation to do so.34 Ironically, although regulators have viewed 
sponsor support with suspicion, a suspicion that is reflected in 
elements of the SEC’s 2014 rule,35 it is an unexplored mechanism for 
enhancing MMF stability. 
This Article argues for a dramatic shift in the regulation of 
MMFs. Rather than trying to make them operate more like banks by 
requiring capital buffers or sacrificing their viability by mandating a 
floating NAV, reform should formalize the role of sponsor support. 
Specifically, this Article proposes that regulators require MMF 
sponsors to stand behind their MMFs by committing to maintain the 
stable $1 NAV. In a time of crisis, sponsors could provide such 
support by buying distressed assets from the fund, reducing 
management fees, or subsidizing the fund with other business 
revenues. Sponsors could also privately insure their obligation. 
Mandatory sponsor support offers several advantages over the 
2014 rule and other reform proposals. It would both prevent MMFs 
from breaking the buck and harness market discipline to provide fund 
sponsors with appropriate incentives to limit risk-taking. Required 
 
 30. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment 
Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (2014) (explaining that the 
separation of investment assets and management assets is a distinctive feature of 
investment funds). 
 31. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1961, 1968 (2010). 
 32. See Morley, supra note 30, at 1232. 
 33. See 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 33,869 (explaining that fund managers 
and their affiliated persons have historically supported the stable value of MMFs through 
significant sources of private capital). 
 34. See id. (explaining that historically sponsor support has been provided on a 
voluntary basis and may not be provided in the future). 
 35. See, e.g., 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,736, 47,742 & n.52 (noting that 
“sponsor support has not been fully transparent to investors and this, in turn, may have 
lessened some investors’ understanding of the risk in money market funds”). 
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sponsor support would eliminate market uncertainty about the extent 
to which a sponsor would voluntarily support its fund in a time of 
crisis—uncertainty that contributed to the turmoil surrounding the 
events at the Reserve Primary Fund. Sponsor support would 
substitute sponsor financial stability for the need for investors to 
monitor the quality of MMF assets directly, a task that the SEC has 
highlighted with its new and unworkable disclosure requirements. 
Most importantly, sponsor support would address MMF fragility 
while allowing MMFs to continue to meet investor demand for a 
liquid, stable-value, cash-management option. 
The Article begins in Part I by briefly outlining the core 
attributes of MMFs, the events leading up to the Reserve Fund’s 
breaking the buck, and the SEC’s initial response—the 2010 MMF 
reforms. Part II describes the case for further regulatory reform and 
the flawed and controversial reform effort. Part III evaluates the 
SEC’s 2014 rule. In Part IV, the Article introduces its proposed 
alternative—mandatory sponsor support for a $1 NAV. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Structure of MMFs 
MMFs are a type of mutual fund and are regulated by the SEC 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940.36 MMFs offer investors 
access to a pool of short-term debt securities, often called money 
market securities.37 Money market securities include government 
securities, repurchase agreements, certificates of deposit, and 
commercial paper.38 The critical feature that distinguishes MMFs 
from other short-term investment funds is that, while the price of 
most mutual funds fluctuates on a daily basis in accordance with the 
funds’ NAV,39 MMF shares are bought and sold at a stable $1 share 
price.40 The $1 share price facilitates the role of MMFs as a cash-
 
 36. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2010)); see, e.g., Fisch, supra note 31, at 
1967 (describing regulation of mutual funds). 
 37. See, e.g., Randall Dodd, What Are Money Markets?, FIN. & DEV., June 2012, at 
46, 46 (describing money markets and various types of money market securities). 
 38. See, e.g., id. 
 39. Mutual funds are priced as of the 4:00 PM close of their trading day; orders to sell 
or purchase fund shares must be submitted prior to the 4:00 PM close. Fisch & Roiter, 
supra note 1, at 1009. 
 40. See, e.g., 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,834–35. The price that MMFs pay 
for authorization to trade at $1 per share is compliance with SEC Rule 2a-7, which 
imposes a variety of constraints on the safety and liquidity of the assets in which MMFs 
are permitted to invest. Id. at 36,836; see also 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,736, 
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management tool because the frequent investment and redemption of 
MMF shares does not result in a gain or loss for tax or accounting 
purposes.41 As a result, MMFs offer investors both liquidity and 
stability. Importantly, unlike bank deposits, MMFs are not protected 
by federal insurance.42 
Several types of MMFs exist, including those that invest in 
government securities (government MMFs), those that invest in 
municipal securities in order to generate tax-exempt income (tax-
exempt MMFs), and those that invest primarily in commercial paper 
and other non-government securities (prime MMFs). Some MMFs 
are held by institutional investors; others are largely retail funds. 
Because MMFs provide same-day liquidity, investors use MMFs 
primarily for cash management.43 Retail investors use MMFs as an 
alternative to traditional bank deposit and checking accounts and as a 
sweep investment to facilitate trades in brokerage accounts.44 
Institutional investors use MMFs as a holding vehicle for cash and to 
manage operating expenditures such as payroll.45 MMFs have 
traditionally offered investors higher returns and greater 
diversification than traditional bank accounts,46 as well as features 
like check writing and debit-card access.47 
MMFs are mutual funds, not bank accounts. Each MMF is 
organized as a discrete legal entity—a corporation or business trust.48 
The fund’s sponsor manages the fund’s assets pursuant to an advisory 
contract.49 When investors purchase shares in an MMF, the sponsor 
uses those funds to purchase short-term debt securities. As with other 
mutual fund investors, an MMF shareholder has an equity interest— 
he or she owns a pro rata percentage of the securities held by the 
 
47,774–75 (explaining that the decision to allow MMFs to trade at a stable share price was 
a regulatory concession that the SEC is now, in the case of prime institutional MMFs, 
eliminating); Fisch, supra note 31, at 1975 (describing Rule 2a-7). 
 41. See 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,837 (describing the “tax and 
administrative convenience” of stable $1 share price). 
 42. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Form N1-A, Item 4(b)(1)(ii) (requiring MMFs 
explicitly to disclose that investments are not protected by FDIC insurance). 
 43. See Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO, Inv. Co. Inst., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1, 7 (Sept. 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/13_ici_mmf_ltr.pdf [hereinafter Stevens Letter]. 
 44. Kathleen C. Joaquin et al., Operational Impacts of Proposed Redemption 
Restrictions on Money Market Funds, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. 6–7 (2012), 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_operational_mmf.pdf . 
 45. Id. at 6. 
 46. Stevens Letter, supra note 43, at 6. 
 47. Joaquin et. al., supra note 44, at 7. 
 48. Fisch, supra note 31, at 1968. 
 49. Id. 
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MMF. As with other mutual funds, shares in an MMF are redeemable 
on a daily basis.50 In addition, MMF assets are segregated from the 
assets of other funds sold by the sponsor as well as from the sponsor’s 
own assets.51 MMF sponsors vary—approximately half are traditional 
mutual fund companies such as Vanguard and Fidelity; approximately 
half are bank affiliates.52 
MMFs are able to maintain a stable $1 share price for two 
reasons. First, SEC rules allow MMFs to engage in “penny rounding,” 
meaning that so long as the NAV does not fall below $0.995 or above 
$1.0049, the fund’s shares may trade at $1 per share.53 Second, MMFs 
are managed in a manner that limits the difference between the funds’ 
NAV and $1 per share. The investments of MMFs, unlike most 
mutual funds, are conservative securities that are typically held to 
maturity.54 MMFs rarely sell their portfolio holdings unless compelled 
to do so by redemption requests.55 Indeed, the money market 
instruments in which MMFs invest are rarely traded. As a result, 
while the value of the MMF’s portfolio may fluctuate on a daily basis, 
the value of any particular asset will approach its face amount as the 
instrument nears maturity. Since 1982, SEC rules have reflected this 
fact by allowing MMFs to value their portfolio assets using amortized 
cost accounting rather than market price.56 
If an MMF’s share price drops below $0.995, it is required to 
price its shares at 99 cents (or less).57 This is described as “breaking 
the buck.”58 MMFs rarely break the buck because MMF sponsors 
 
 50. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1008. 
 51. See Morley, supra note 30, at 1232. 
 52. Marco Cipriani, Presentation on Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, FED. 
RESERVE BD. OF N.Y. 15 (Mar. 5, 2013), 
www.newyorkfed.org/education/pdf/2013/cipriani.pdf; see also Marcin Kacperczyk & 
Philipp Schnabl, How Safe Are Money Market Funds?, 128 Q.J. OF ECON. 1073, 1092 tbl.1 
(2013) (describing characteristics and extent of sponsors’ non-MMF business). 
 53. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,736–37 (explaining amortized cost 
valuation and penny rounding). In contrast, other mutual funds must calculate their price 
to the nearest 1/10 of 1%. Id. 
 54. Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1008. 
 55. The infrequency with which MMFs trade is reflected in the fact that MMFs, unlike 
other mutual funds, are not required to disclose their turnover rates to investors. See U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Form N1-A, Item 3(5) (“A Fund that is a Money Market Fund may 
omit the portfolio turnover information required by this Item.”). 
 56. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1014–15 (describing SEC acceptance of 
amortized cost accounting). 
 57. See, e.g., SEC Staff Report, supra note 8, at 57 (noting that an MMF breaks the 
buck when its price drops below $0.995). 
 58. In the course of history, two MMFs have broken the buck: the Reserve Primary 
Fund in 2008 and the Community Bankers U.S. Government Fund, a small institutional 
fund, in 1994. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1006 n.15. 
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have traditionally been willing to support the $1 share price.59 
Sponsor support is discretionary—indeed, current SEC rules do not 
permit sponsors to commit in advance to support a fund’s share 
price.60 Sponsor support may take the form of capital support 
agreements, letters of credit, waiving management fees, or purchasing 
distressed assets from the MMF at amortized cost.61 Sponsor support 
can prevent a fund’s NAV from departing too far below $1 per share 
or provide a fund with sufficient liquidity to meet redemption 
requests without being forced to sell assets at distressed prices. 
On the supply side, MMFs provide a major part of the market for 
short-term debt securities. Historically, prime MMFs’ assets have 
consisted largely of short-term debt instruments issued by financial 
institutions, although their holdings of such assets have declined since 
2008.62 Before the financial crisis, MMFs were the primary buyers of 
commercial paper.63 Although after the financial crisis, MMFs 
decreased their holdings of commercial paper in favor of safer assets 
such as Treasuries,64 as of June 2012, MMFs held 43% of nonfinancial 
commercial paper and 33% of repurchase agreements.65 
MMFs are also an important source of financing for state and 
local governments and government entities. In 2008, MMFs were the 
largest institutional holders of municipal bonds, second only to retail 
investors.66 Since 2008, MMFs have reduced their holdings of 
 
 59. See 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,834, 36,840–41 (detailing frequency of 
sponsor support from 1994 to 2011). 
 60. See infra note 320. Rule 17a-9 permits discretionary sponsor support. See 2013 
Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,839 n.41. 
 61. See Letter from James J. Angel, Assoc. Professor of Fin., Georgetown Univ., to 
the Fin. Stability Oversight Council 4–11 (Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/mms-response/mmsresponse-27.pdf). 
 62. 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,922. 
 63. See, e.g., Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 52, at 1–2; see also Carol A. DeNale, 
Corporate Treasurer, CVS Caremark, Remarks at the Roundtable on Money Market 
Funds and Systemic Risk 8 (May 10, 2011), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/mmf-
risk/mmf-risk-transcript-051011.htm (“[CVS Caremark has] a three and a half billion 
dollar commercial paper program. I look to [MMFs] to purchase commercial paper. 
Approximately 40% of my outstanding CP at any given time is owned by a 2a-7 fund. 
That’s an amazingly important part of our capital structure, and one that will not easily be 
replaced.”). 
 64. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 8, at 23–25. 
 65. Marco Cipriani, Antoine Martin & Bruno Maria Parigi, The Fragility of an MMF-
Intermediated Financial System, LIBERTY STREET ECON. (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/12/the-fragility-of-an-mmf-
intermediated-financial-system.html. 
 66. Lisa Lambert, Bank Holdings of U.S. Municipal Bonds Hit Record High, 
REUTERS (June 6, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/06/usa-
economy-debt-municipals-idUSL1N0EI1CU20130606. 
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municipal bonds dramatically, a shift that is largely due to a decline in 
interest rates.67 
SEC Rule 2a-7 regulates both the quality and the maturity of 
MMF portfolio assets. The rule requires MMFs’ investment portfolios 
to have a weighted average maturity (“WAM”) of sixty days.68 An 
MMF is required to invest at least 97% of its assets in first tier 
securities.69 At least 10% of an MMF’s assets must be in cash, U.S. 
Treasury securities, or securities that mature within one day (daily 
liquid assets),70 and at least 30% must be in securities that mature 
within a week (weekly liquid assets).71 Since the financial crisis, most 
MMFs have invested more conservatively than required by the rule.72 
The average maturity for instruments held by prime MMFs in 
October 2012, for example, was forty-two days.73 As of June 2012, 
prime MMFs held 31% of their assets in daily liquid assets and 46% 
in weekly liquid assets.74 
B. The Reserve Primary Fund 
In the early morning of September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy.75 The Reserve Primary Fund held approximately 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. This requirement, which reflects a reduction from the prior WAM requirement of 
ninety days, was a component of the 2010 MMF reforms. See Money Market Fund 
Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,070 (Mar. 4, 2010) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270 & 274) [hereinafter 2010 Final Rule]. 
 69. First tier securities are securities that have received the highest short-term debt 
rating from the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSRO”) or 
have been determined by the fund’s board to be of comparable quality. The rules further 
provide that an MMF cannot invest more than half of 1% of its assets in second tier 
securities issued by any single issuer and may not buy second tier securities that mature in 
more than forty-five days (rather than the previous limit of 397 days). SEC Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)(ii), (c)(4)(i)(C) (2014). Second tier 
securities are eligible securities that, if rated, have received other than the highest short-
term debt rating from the requisite NRSROs or, if unrated, have been determined by the 
fund’s board of directors to be of comparable quality. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(26) 
(defining “second tier security”); see also § 270.2a-7(a)(14) (defining “first tier security”). 
 70. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(5)(ii). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 8, at 18–26 (describing changes in MMF 
portfolio composition following the 2010 MMF reforms). 
 73. Sean Collins et al., Money Market Mutual Funds, Risk, and Financial Stability in 
the Wake of the 2010 Reforms, 19 ICI Res. Persp., Jan. 2013, at 1, 14. 
 74. Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO, Inv. Co. Inst., to the Fin. 
Stability Oversight Council 22 (Jan. 24, 2013), available at 
www.ici.org/pdf/13_fsoc_mmf_recs.pdf . 
 75. Lehman filed its bankruptcy petition at 1:45 A.M. Monday morning. Peg Brickley, 
Lehman Makes It Official in Overnight Chapter 11 Filing, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2008), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wallstreetcrisis/2008/09/15/lehman-makes-it-official/. 
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1.2% of its portfolio in short-term Lehman debt, debt that, as of the 
date that Lehman filed for bankruptcy, was rated prime-1 by 
Moody’s76—Moody’s highest short-term debt rating.77 Moody’s 
downgraded the Lehman debt on September 15, 2008, at which time 
the Reserve Fund received redemption requests of $25 billion, 
reflecting more than 40% of the fund’s value.78 The next day, the fund 
broke the buck and, following the announcement, suspended 
redemptions.79 Investors eventually recovered more than 99 cents on 
the dollar but were required to wait sixteen months to recover all 
their money.80 
The Reserve Fund was not the only MMF to receive substantial 
redemption requests during Lehman week.81 Moreover, the broader 
instability of financial institutions offered the prospect of a problem 
that extended well beyond the Lehman bonds. A widespread failure 
of financial firms would greatly increase the pressure on MMFs by 
multiplying the extent of their losses on financial-firm debt 
instruments. As then-executive vice president of the Markets Group 
at the New York Office of the Federal Reserve, William Dudley 
observed in the meeting of the Federal Reserve Board on September 
16, 2008, “The risk here, of course, is that, if AIG were to fail, money 
funds have even a broader exposure to them than to Lehman, and so 
breaking the buck on the money market funds is a real risk.”82 
The government responded to this concern by establishing a 
Treasury Department Temporary Guarantee Program for Money 
Market Funds and the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (“AMLF”), created by the 
 
 76. See Rating Action: Moody’s Places Lehman’s A2 Rating on Review with Direction 
Uncertain, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Sept. 10, 2008), https://www.moodys.com/ 
research/Moodys-places-Lehmans-A2-rating-on-review-with-direction-uncertain--
PR_162621 (warning that Lehman’s short-term ratings were being placed under review). 
Moody’s did not downgrade Lehman until September 15, 2008. See Rating Action: 
Moody’s Places Lehman’s A2 Rating on Review with Direction Uncertain, MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERVICE (Sept. 15, 2008), https://www.moodys.com/research/ Moodys-lowers-
Lehman-to-B3Non-Prime-on-review-for-possible--PR_162853 [hereinafter Moody’s 
Rating Action]. 
 77. See Moody’s Rating Symbols and Definitions, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE 10 
(June 2009), https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/ 
MoodysRatingsSymbolsand%20Definitions.pdf. 
 78. See Moody’s Rating Action, supra note 76. 
 79. For further details, see Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1018–19. 
 80. Id. at 1019. 
 81. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 82. William Dudley, Manager, System Open Market Account, Remarks at the 
Federal Open Market Committee. Meeting 4–5 (Sept. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080916meeting.pdf. 
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Federal Reserve Board. The Temporary Guarantee Program was 
designed to reduce redemption requests by assuring investors that 
they would not lose the value of money invested in MMFs.83 Under 
the terms of the program, MMFs paid a premium in exchange for the 
federal government agreeing to guarantee the amortized cost value of 
their portfolios as of September 19, 2008.84 The guarantee only 
extended to money invested in the MMFs as of that date—new 
deposits into MMFs were not covered by the guarantee.85 Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke explained that this limit was 
designed to prevent the guarantee from causing money to run from 
bank deposits into MMFs.86 Participation in the program was 
voluntary, but virtually all MMFs chose to participate.87 The federal 
government did not pay out any funds pursuant to the guarantee but 
received $1.2 billion in premiums.88 
The Federal Reserve Board also created the AMLF to provide a 
market for asset backed commercial paper.89 The AMLF created this 
 
 83. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty 
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1147.aspx. The guaranty was funded by the $50 billion 
Exchange Stabilization Fund, but no MMF drew upon the Stabilization Fund, and the 
program expired on September 18, 2009. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Treasury Announces Expiration of Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 
18, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg293.aspx 
[hereinafter Press Release, Expiration of Guarantee Program]. 
 84. The program required 
money market funds with a net asset value per share greater than or equal to 
$0.9975 as of the close of business on September 19, 2008, to pay an upfront fee of 
0.01 percent, 1 basis point, based on the number of shares outstanding on that 
date. Funds with net asset value per share of greater than or equal to $0.995 and 
below $0.9975 [were required] to pay an upfront fee of 0.015 percent . . . . 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee 
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx. 
 85. Id. The guarantee was originally scheduled to last for three months but was 
extended to just over a year in duration. See Treasury’s Guarantee Program for Money 
Market Mutual Funds: What You Should Know, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, 
http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/mutualfunds/p117136 (last 
updated July 9, 2010). 
 86. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks in Conference Call of the Federal 
Open Market Committee. 8 (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080929confcall.pdf. 
 87. See, e.g., John Carney, Treasury’s Secretive $2.4 Trillion Mutual Fund Guarantee, 
CNBC (Aug. 10, 2012, 6:14 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48578949 (reporting that over 
99% of MMF assets were covered by the guarantee). 
 88. Press Release, Expiration of Guarantee Program, supra note 83. 
 89. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve 
Board Announces Two Enhancements to Its Programs to Provide Liquidity to Markets 
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market indirectly by providing financing to U.S. banks that purchased 
commercial paper from MMFs.90 To facilitate these purchases, the 
Federal Reserve extended nonrecourse credit to the purchasing banks 
at its primary credit rate.91 Importantly, in order to obtain these 
terms, the banks had to purchase the commercial paper at amortized 
cost rather than market value.92 
The AMLF had two distinct objectives.93 First, it provided a 
source of liquidity for MMFs that were subject to redemption 
requests.94 Second, it provided price support to the commercial paper 
market by propping up the price at which commercial paper was 
traded. This avoided the need for MMFs to engage in distressed sales 
that would have reduced the value of the underlying short-term credit 
instruments.95 
The AMLF was quite successful. At its peak, it provided 
financing for approximately 22% of the asset-backed commercial 
paper market in the United States.96 The facility was used by 105 
MMFs, which represented 42% of eligible prime MMFs.97 
Importantly, empirical research found that the AMLF reduced 
redemption requests and outflows from MMFs, thus addressing the 
liquidity concern.98 It also found that use of the AMLF helped reduce 
Asset Backed Commercial Paper (“ABCP”) yields, meaning that it 
 
(Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
monetary/20080919a.htm. 
 90. See Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., How Effective Were the Federal Reserve 
Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, 68 J. FIN. 715, 721–24 (2013) (describing 
the AMLF). 
 91. See Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund 
(MMMF) Liquidity Facility Terms and Conditions, FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT 
WINDOW, http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/mmmftc.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID (last 
updated Feb. 5, 2010). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 90, at 721–22. 
 94. See Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund 
(MMMF) Liquidity Facility (AMLF or “the Facility”): Frequently Asked Questions and 
Answers, FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW, https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Home/ 
GeneralPages/Asset-Backed-Commercial-Paper-ABCP-Money-Market-Mutual-Fund-
MMMF-Liquidity-Facility-AMLF-or-the-Facility-#f1 (last updated Feb. 5, 2010) 
(explaining that AMLF was established to “help restore liquidity to the ABCP markets 
and thereby to help money funds meet demands for redemption”). 
 95. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
(AMLF), FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_amlf.htm (last 
updated Dec. 9, 2014). 
 96. Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 90, at 721–22. 
 97. Id. at 724. 
 98. See id. at 727–28. 
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was effective in preventing commercial paper from trading at 
distressed prices.99 
An additional factor that limited the scope of the outflow is that 
redemption requests during Lehman week were concentrated 
primarily among institutional investors. As the SEC noted, fewer than 
5% of retail funds experienced redemption requests of greater than 
5% on each of September 17 to 19, 2008, compared to 22–30% of 
institutional funds.100 
C. The SEC’s 2010 MMF Reforms 
In January 2010, the SEC responded to the Reserve Primary 
Fund situation and the broader turmoil in the MMF industry by 
amending Rule 2a-7 in an effort to make MMFs more resistant to the 
effects of adverse economic events in the future.101 The reforms 
included requirements that MMF portfolios have higher investment 
quality, shorter maturities, and greater liquidity.102 There is little 
dispute that these reforms enhanced MMF stability.103 
MMFs were also required by the rule to engage in periodic stress 
testing so as to determine how likely the fund was to break the buck 
in the event of adverse economic developments or heavy redemption 
requests.104 As a component of this stress testing, MMFs were 
required to incorporate “know your customer” evaluations in their 
stress testing procedures, based on an understanding of their 
customers’ liquidity needs.105 Finally, MMFs were subjected to 
increased disclosure requirements,106 including a requirement that 
MMFs disclose their portfolio holdings both publicly and to the 
SEC.107 
 
 99. Id. at 735. 
 100. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,794–95. 
 101. 2010 Final Rule, supra note 68, at 10,062. 
 102. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1022 (describing 2010 reforms in detail). 
 103. See generally, e.g., Collins et al., supra note 73 (analyzing effect of 2010 reforms); 
SEC Staff Report, supra note 8 (same). 
 104. 2010 Final Rule, supra note 68, at 10,079. 
 105. See id. at 10,079 n.261 (“As discussed above, amended rule 2a-7’s new liquidity 
requirements require money market funds to evaluate their liquidity needs based on their 
shareholder base . . . . Money market funds should also incorporate this element in their 
stress testing procedures as appropriate.”). 
 106. See Collins et al., supra note 73, at 3–4 (explaining how this increased 
transparency enabled the market to monitor MMFs’ exposures during 2011). 
 107. 2010 Final Rule, supra note 68, at 10,083–84. The 2010 reforms contained several 
additional components, including a formalized procedure permitting fund affiliates to 
purchase distressed assets from the fund—a key mechanism for sponsor support—and a 
rule permitting MMFs to suspend redemptions in order to conduct an orderly liquidation. 
See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1023. 
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A subtle108 but potentially significant component of the 2010 
reforms was the addition of a requirement that MMFs periodically 
calculate a “shadow NAV” reflecting the value of the MMF portfolio 
using a market-based valuation approach rather than amortized 
cost.109 As a result of the 2010 amendments, MMF boards of directors 
must establish written procedures for the calculation of the shadow 
NAV, periodically review deviations between the shadow NAV and 
the amortized cost valuation, and promptly consider whether any 
action should be taken if the deviation exceeds half of 1%—the 
amount of deviation that could potentially require a fund to break the 
buck.110 As we will see, the concept of a shadow NAV is a critical 
component of further policy reforms, including the 2014 rule.111 
II.  THE CASE FOR FURTHER REGULATORY REFORM 
A. Concern that the 2010 Reforms Were Not Enough 
When it adopted the 2010 rule changes, the SEC noted that more 
fundamental changes to MMFs might be needed. Chair Mary 
Schapiro identified several possible regulatory alternatives, including, 
most prominently, a requirement that MMFs shift to a floating NAV 
rather than trading at a stable $1 share price.112 Schapiro stated that, 
although the various alternatives remained under consideration and 
further study was necessary, she was “committed to continuing to 
move forward with reforming the money market fund industry.”113 
At the same time that the SEC was adopting the 2010 MMF 
reforms, the Treasury Department was developing a package of 
financial regulatory reforms designed to address the conditions that, 
in its view, contributed to the financial crisis.114 In June 2009, the 
 
 108. For example, in its 2013 Rule Proposal, the SEC summarizes the 2010 regulatory 
reforms but does not describe the shadow pricing requirements. See 2013 Rule Proposal, 
supra note 9, at 36,840–41. 
 109. SEC Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(A) (2014) 
(codifying Rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii)(A)). 
 110. See 2010 Final Rule, supra note 68, at 10,113–14. 
 111. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text. 
 112. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Money 
Market Funds Before the Open Commission Meeting (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2010/spch012710mls-mmf.htm. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION & REGULATION 4 (2009), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf 
[hereinafter TREASURY DEP’T REPORT] (describing its proposals as designed “to address 
the causes of the current crisis, to create a more stable financial system that is fair for 
consumers, and to help prevent and contain potential crises in the future”). 
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Treasury Department released Financial Regulatory Reform: A New 
Foundation Report (“Treasury Department Report”).115 The Treasury 
Department Report contained reforms aimed at meeting five main 
objectives, one of which was promoting the “Robust Supervision and 
Regulation of Financial Firms.”116 In achieving that objective, the 
Treasury proposed the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (“FSOC”).117 Congress responded to this suggestion, creating 
the FSOC as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act in 2010.118 
Treasury also stated that the SEC should move forward with its 
plans to strengthen the regulation of MMFs119 and that the 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets should 
prepare a report assessing whether more fundamental changes 
are necessary to further reduce the MMF industry’s 
susceptibility to runs, such as eliminating the ability of a MMF 
to use a stable net asset value or requiring MMFs to obtain 
access to reliable emergency liquidity facilities from private 
sources.120 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 5. 
 117. Id. (originally proposed as the Financial Services Oversight Council). 
 118. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §§ 111–12, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–98 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C). The FSOC consists of ten voting members including the Secretary of 
the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the heads of various federal agencies, including the SEC 
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), as well as five nonvoting 
members, including an independent insurance expert, and representatives of state 
regulators. Financial Stability Oversight Council, Who is on the Council?, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2015). 
 119. The Treasury Department Report was fairly specific about the reforms that it 
recommended the SEC adopt. See TREASURY DEP’T REPORT, supra note 114, at 38. 
These reforms had already been described in the SEC’s proposed rulemaking, which had 
been released for public comment at the time of the report’s release. See Money Market 
Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 28807, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,716–
19 (proposed July 8, 2009) [hereinafter MMF Proposing Release] (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 120. TREASURY DEP’T REPORT, supra note 114, at 12. The private liquidity facility 
option was a form of bank-like regulation, which would have provided temporary liquidity to 
MMFs in times of financial stress. The mutual fund industry subsequently developed a 
proposal for a private liquidity facility. See Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, CEO, Inv. Co. 
Inst., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 23–31 (Jan. 10, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-619/4619-49.pdf (describing private liquidity 
facility proposal). 
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Following Treasury’s direction,121 the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Markets (“PWG”)122 undertook a study of possible 
additional MMF reforms and published a report on reform options in 
October 2010 (“PWG Report”).123 The PWG Report identified and 
discussed eight policy options ranging from the elimination of a stable 
NAV to regulating MMFs as special purpose banks and subjecting 
them to bank regulation and oversight.124 The Report devoted 
considerable attention to justifying the need for additional reform 
efforts, primarily by reiterating the fact that, despite the SEC’s rule 
changes, MMFs remained vulnerable to runs and by highlighting the 
destabilizing effect of runs on the economy.125 
The SEC then began to develop an additional rulemaking 
proposal.126 According to Chairman Schapiro, the two alternatives 
under consideration were a floating NAV and required capital 
buffers.127 Chairman Schapiro indicated that she supported one or 
both of these reforms128 and that she “consider[ed] the structural 
 
 121. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM 
OPTIONS 1 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter PWG REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/10.21%20PWG%20Report%20Final.pdf (“This report by the 
PWG responds to Treasury’s call.”). 
 122. The members of the PWG included the Secretary of the Treasury Department (as 
chairman of the PWG), the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Chairman of the SEC, and the Chairman of the CFTC. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 123. Id. at 1. 
 124. See id. at 4–6 (describing eight policy options). 
 125. Id. at 8–11. The PWG Report also discussed possible means of implementing the 
reform alternatives, but it did not recommend any specific reform. See id. at 18–35. 
 126. Toward this end, the SEC issued a request for comment on the PWG Report. 
President’s Working Group Report on Money Market Fund Reform, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 29497, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,636 (proposed Nov. 8, 2010), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/ic-29497.pdf. It also hosted a Roundtable on Money 
Market Funds and Systematic Risk (the 2011 Roundtable). See Unofficial Transcript: 
Roundtable on Money Market Funds & Systematic Risk, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
(May 10, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/mmf-risk/mmf-risk-transcript-051011.htm 
[hereinafter Roundtable Transcript]. The main regulatory alternatives discussed at the 
Roundtable were requiring that MMFs convert to a floating NAV, subjecting MMFs to 
bank-like regulation in exchange for the provision of outside liquidity support, or 
mandating that MMFs maintain some type of capital buffer. Id. 
 127. Schapiro Statement, supra note 21. Schapiro subsequently explained that capital 
buffers were an attractive regulatory reform because they would allow a fund “to absorb 
the day-to-day variations in the value of a money market fund’s holdings.” Id. 
 128. See id.; see also Daniel M. Gallagher & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Statement on the Regulation of Money Market Funds (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082812dmgtap.htm [hereinafter Gallagher & 
Paredes Statement] (describing the “Chairman’s preferred alternatives of a ‘floating NAV’ 
and a capital buffer coupled with a holdback restriction”). 
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reform of money markets one of the pieces of unfinished business 
from the financial crisis.”129 
At the time, other members of the Commission disagreed about 
the desirability of going forward with the staff’s proposal. 
Commissioner Aguilar issued a public statement raising concern 
about the accuracy of the information upon which the staff proposal 
relied.130 He also argued that the SEC should not regulate MMFs 
further without more broadly studying the cash-management 
industry.131 Commissioners Gallagher and Paredes stated that they 
were not convinced that the Commission’s alternatives would 
“achieve the goal of stemming a run on money market funds, 
particularly during a period of widespread financial crisis.”132 The 
dissenting Commissioners also argued that the case had not been 
made for reform.133 They noted that the 2010 reforms had not been 
shown to be ineffective.134 Furthermore, the Chairman’s proposal 
would, in their view, compromise the functioning of MMFs, inflicting 
harm both on investors and on those who obtain short-term funding 
from MMFs.135 In light of the lack of agreement among the 
Commissioners, on August 22, 2012, Chairman Schapiro announced 
that the Commission would not, at that time, go forward with the staff 
proposal.136 
To address the concerns expressed by Commissioners Aguilar, 
Gallagher, and Paredes, the SEC Division of Risk, Strategy, and 
Financial Innovation undertook to study and report on three 
questions: the causes of the high level of MMF redemptions in 
September 2008, the efficacy of the 2010 MMF reforms, and the 
potential impact of additional reforms on investor demand for MMFs 
 
 129. Schapiro Statement, supra note 21. 
 130. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Regarding 
Money Market Funds (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/ 
PublicStmt/1365171491044. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Gallagher & Paredes Statement, supra note 128. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (noting that “the empirical evidence we have so far, such as the performance of 
money market funds during the ongoing Eurozone crisis and the U.S. debt ceiling impasse 
and downgrade in 2011, suggests just the opposite—that money market funds can meet 
substantial redemption requests, in large part, we have heard, because of the 2010 
reforms”). 
 135. See id. (“[W]e are concerned that the Chairman’s proposal would, at a minimum, 
severely compromise the utility and functioning of money market funds, which would 
inflict harm on retail and institutional investors who have come to rely on money market 
funds for investing and as a means of cash-management and on states, municipalities, and 
businesses that borrow from money market funds.”). 
 136. Schapiro Statement, supra note 21. 
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and alternative investment vehicles.137 The SEC Staff Report, which 
was released on November 30, 2012, presented a variety of data 
responsive to all three questions.138 The staff concluded that the 2010 
reforms had made MMFs “more resilient now to both portfolio losses 
and investor redemptions than they were in 2008.”139 Nonetheless, the 
Report concluded, through a series of simulations, that the reforms 
would not have been sufficient to prevent the Reserve Primary Fund 
from breaking the buck in 2008.140 
The key empirical finding of the Report was largely a foregone 
conclusion because the empirical methodology sought to determine 
whether a fund could avoid breaking the buck if it sustained losses of 
more than 1%, as the Reserve Fund did. Unsurprisingly then, the 
Report concluded that “[t]he rate at which funds break the buck 
approaches 100% for capital losses that exceed 1% regardless of 
whether there are either redemption requests or WLA [weekly liquid 
asset] requirements.”141 By definition, a fund that suffers a 1% loss 
will have an NAV of 99 cents and will break the buck in the absence 
of an outside source of funding such as sponsor support. The staff’s 
complex simulations were unnecessary to establish this point.142 The 
SEC subsequently concluded from these findings that the 2010 
reforms were not “sufficient.”143 
When the SEC announced that a majority of the Commissioners 
did not support further MMF reforms,144 Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner urged the FSOC, which he chaired, to become involved.145 
At his prompting, the FSOC took the unprecedented step of releasing 
its own MMF reform recommendations for public comment.146 The 
FSOC described its proposal as pursuant to its authority under 
section 120 of Dodd-Frank147 to “provide for more stringent 
 
 137. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 8, at 1. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 37. Importantly, the Report observed that this assumed that the fund would 
not have changed its holdings in light of the overall changes to Rule 2a-7. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. The SEC staff provided a multi-page appendix supporting its conclusion including 
a Monte Carlo simulation. Id. at 74–80. 
 143. 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,848.  
 144. Schapiro Statement, supra note 21. 
 145. Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Members of the Fin. 
Stability Oversight Council (Sept. 27, 2012), available at http://link.coremotivesmarketing.com/ 
c/306/c9c08c9c7eb64ed07c9d05c3c47da44ef8d1713cb48f31b665172e5bd3d9dbe6. 
 146. See Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, 
77 Fed. Reg. 69,455, 69,457 (proposed Nov. 19, 2012) [hereinafter FSOC Proposal]. 
 147. See id. at 69,455; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 120(a), (c)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1408–09 (2010) (codified 
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regulation of such financial activity or practice by issuing 
recommendations to a primary financial regulatory agency to apply 
new or heightened standards or safeguards.”148 Significantly, this was 
the first time the FSOC used its authority under Dodd-Frank to issue 
recommendations to another regulatory agency.149 
The FSOC proposal consisted of three options that it 
recommended the SEC implement individually or in combination.150 
The options, which bore a strong resemblance to those that the SEC 
had already considered and tabled, were (1) requiring MMFs to 
switch from a fixed to a floating NAV; (2) providing for a NAV 
capital buffer of up to 1%, supplied by an MMF sponsor, together 
with a required minimum balance at risk for MMF investors; or (3) 
requiring a risk-based capital buffer of up to 3%, which could be 
combined with other risk-reducing measures.151 Although 
commentators criticized the FSOC’s actions for several reasons,152 the 
recommendations had the intended effect of pressuring the SEC, in 
2013, to release a rule proposing substantial structural reforms to 
MMFs.153 The SEC subsequently adopted a modified version of this 
proposed rule, which will be discussed in Part III.154 
 
as amended in scattered sections of Title 12 U.S.C.) (permitting the FSOC to issue 
recommendations to financial regulatory institutions to implement heightened standards). 
 148. FSOC Proposal, supra note 146, at 69,456. 
 149. See Stephen A. Keen, FSOC and Money Market Fund Reform: A Path to 
Nowhere, REED SMITH (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.reedsmith.com/FSOC-and-Money-
Market-Fund-Reform-A-Path-to-Nowhere-10-08-2012/ (explaining that this was the first 
time that FSOC was being asked to use its power under section 120). 
 150. Id.; see also Lea Anne Copenhefer & Roger P. Joseph, FSOC Turns Up the Heat 
on Money Market Fund Reform, BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN (Nov. 21, 2012), 
http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2012/11/FSOC-Turns-Up-the-Heat-on-Money-Market-
Fund-Reform (describing the FSOC’s reform proposal). 
 151. FSOC Proposal, supra note 146, at 69,456. The FSOC Proposal also requested the 
SEC to increase the minimum weekly liquidity requirements for MMFs from 30% to 40%. 
Id. at 69,476. 
 152. See, e.g., Keen, supra note 149; Gallagher Remarks, supra note 26 (describing 
FSOC’s involvement in the effort to regulate MMFs as a threat to the political 
independence of the Commission); Sean Foley, Note, Money Market Fund Reform & The 
Financial Stability Oversight Council, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 308, 313–19 (2013) 
(questioning FSOC’s use of its power under section 120). 
 153. See generally 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9 (proposing two alternative reform 
options for the MMF industry); see also Sarah N. Lynch, Schapiro: U.S. Risk Council Gave 
Life to Money Fund Reforms, REUTERS (June 4, 2013, 10:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com 
/article/2013/06/04/us-sec-moneyfunds-schapiro-idUSBRE9530PY20130604 (quoting former 
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro as stating that “I don’t think there is any doubt that, but for 
FSOC stepping in, this issue would have never continued to [be] part of the public debate 
and discussion”). 
 154. See infra notes 189–292 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Case for MMF Vulnerability 
The case for MMF reform was based on a simple logic. The 
structural characteristics of MMFs make them vulnerable to runs.155 
Runs have a destabilizing effect on the economy.156 Reform is 
therefore necessary to reduce or eliminate the risk of future runs.157 
As the PWG Report explained, the primary objective of reform 
efforts should be “to materially reduce MMFs’ susceptibility to 
runs.”158 
The term “run” is typically associated with banks, not mutual 
funds.159 Banks hold money that depositors are entitled to withdraw 
on demand. Banks in turn lend that depositor money to borrowers. If 
too many depositors demand their money at the same time, the bank 
 
 155. See, e.g., PWG REPORT, supra note 121, at 2–3 (describing vulnerability of MMFs 
to runs); 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,837–43 (discussing five characteristics of 
MMFs that make them vulnerable to runs). 
 156. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banking Theory, Deposit 
Insurance, and Bank Regulation, 59 J. BUS. 55, 63–64 (1986) (noting the social cost of bank 
runs and the resulting social value of preventing such runs). 
 157. It is noteworthy that reform advocates justify regulation in terms of the need to 
eliminate the risk of runs, yet regulated banks experience runs with some frequency 
despite the use of capital buffers and federal insurance. In the days before IndyMac’s 
failure, for example, depositors withdrew approximately $1.3 billion of the bank’s 
deposits. Ari Levy & David Mildenberg, IndyMac Seized by U.S. Regulators; Schumer 
Blamed for Failure, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2008, 12:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aAYLeK3YAie4. On September 25, 2008, regulators 
shut down Washington Mutual, the largest savings and loan in the United States, after 
customers had withdrawn over $16.7 billion in deposits in ten days. The Downfall of 
Washington Mutual, IBS CENTER FOR MGMT. RES., http://www.icmrindia.org/casestudies/ 
catalogue/Business%20Strategy/The%20Downfall%20of%20Washington%20Mutual.htm 
(last visited June 12, 2014). At the peak of the financial crisis, Wachovia was losing $1 
billion in deposits per day, according to Federal Reserve Transcripts. See Rick Rothacker, 
New Transcripts: Teetering Wachovia Was Losing $1 Billion in Deposits a Day, 
CHARLOTTEOBSERVER (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2014/02/21/ 
4713938/new-transcripts-wachovia-was-losing.html. These large-scale redemptions are not 
limited to the financial crisis. When the government announced the expiration of the 
expanded government guarantee on bank deposits in January 2013, depositors withdrew 
more than $114 billion from the twenty-five largest U.S. banks. Nick Summers, 
Withdrawn: $114 Billion from Big U.S. Banks, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 23, 
2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-23/missing-114-billion-from-u-dot-s-
dot-banks. 
 158. PWG REPORT, supra note 121, at 2. 
 159. Scholars generally agree that a key component of banks’ susceptibility to runs is 
the maturity mismatch—the bank’s assets are tied up in long-term investments, but the 
bank offers immediate liquidity to depositors. See, e.g., Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 
156, at 63; Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and the 
Problem of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 221, 232 (2014). 
Although MMFs technically present a maturity mismatch, it is far more limited because of 
the liquidity requirements imposed on MMF assets. 
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will not be able to meet those demands and will experience a run.160 
In the classic bank run, those depositors who withdraw their funds the 
fastest are typically able to receive payment in full.161 Those who “run 
slowest” will likely not receive full payment.162 This is the so-called 
first-mover advantage. The classic bank run presents an interesting 
causal question—does the bank’s financial distress trigger the run or 
does the run cause the bank to fail?163 
It is somewhat misleading to characterize heavy investor 
withdrawals from MMFs as a “run” warranting regulatory 
intervention.164 Large and rapid movement of assets in the financial 
markets is common.165 Rather, it seems that two attributes distinguish 
a run from normal movement of assets: panic trading and a first-
mover advantage. As Mary Schapiro put it, the redemptions from the 
Reserve Fund and other MMFs during Lehman week were made by 
“panicked investors.”166 Panic trading implies a degree of 
irrationality—redemptions that are motivated by fear rather than 
genuine financial weakness.167 In contrast, few commentators would 
characterize the widespread selling of Enron stock following the 
 
 160. George Kaufman, Bank Runs: Causes, Benefits, and Costs, 7 Cato J. 559, 561–62 
(1988), available at www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj7n3/cj7n3-2.pdf. 
 161. Id. at 562. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 568 (noting the issue and stating that “few bank failures appear to have 
been directly attributed to runs”). The article further notes that, in the pre-FDIC era, 
bank runs appeared to exert market discipline on bank management to minimize the risk 
associated with the bank’s loan portfolio. Id. 
 164. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 8, at 7 (noting that, although many individual 
MMFs experienced large net redemptions during “the Crisis Month,” other funds gained 
assets during that period); cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher M. Gandia, Money Market 
Funds Run Risk: Will Floating Net Asset Value Fix the Problem?, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 313, 315 (2014) (explaining that “withdrawals [during Lehman week]—call it a run—
amounted to approximately $300 billion, approximately 15% of prime money market fund 
assets”). 
 165. See, e.g., E.S. Browning, Despite Gains, Many Flee Stock Market, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443890304578010500821461868 
(describing how “since the market low in March 2009, investors have yanked a net $138 billion 
from mutual funds and exchange-traded funds that invest in U.S. stocks”); Katy Burne, High-
Yield Bond Funds See $1.9 Billion Outflow in Latest Week, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/high-yield-bond-funds-see-1-9-billion-outflow-in-latest-week-
1418336091 (describing large sales volume in high yield bond market in response to the fall in 
oil prices). 
 166. Schapiro Statement, supra note 21. 
 167. See, e.g., Gillian Wee, Credit Swaps Show Fear, Not Reality, Executives Say, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109 
&sid=a.o1tHRJoe.k&refer=home (describing widening spreads in credit default swaps as 
based on a “a disconnect between the health of [issuer] balance sheets and investor 
behavior”). 
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revelation of fraud as “panic selling.”168 Moreover, panic selling is not 
enough. When the stock market fell more than 1,000 points in a single 
day, the result of a combination of the Greek debt crisis and technical 
problems, there was clearly widespread panic, but no one described 
the sales of stock at free-falling prices as a run.169 Runs are also 
characterized by a first-mover advantage, meaning that investor 
behavior itself causes a shortage or diminution in value of the 
remainder. This leads investors who would not otherwise have traded 
to take action in order to avoid losing out entirely.170 As a result, a run 
can induce scarcity by creating an abnormal level of investor 
demand.171 
Importantly, the mechanics of a run operate differently for an 
MMF than a bank. A bank holds long-term illiquid assets that cannot 
readily be converted to cash. As a result, if a substantial number of a 
bank’s depositors all demand their money, it is impossible for the 
bank to repay them all. In contrast, MMFs hold high-quality short-
term assets that typically can be liquidated at or near par value. As a 
result, under normal market conditions, heavy redemption requests 
would not create a first-mover problem at an MMF because the MMF 
could satisfy those redemption requests by liquidating assets.172 
 
 168. See, e.g., 401(k) Investors Sue Enron, CNN MONEY (Nov. 26, 2001), 
http://money.cnn.com/2001/11/26/401k/q_retire_enron_re/ (explaining how Enron 
employees lost money when they were prevented from selling Enron stock in their 401(k) 
plans after the company revealed damaging financial information). 
 169. Tom Lauricella & Peter A. McKay, Dow Takes a Harrowing 1,010.14-Point Trip, 
WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487043 
70704575227754131412596 (describing how a trading glitch coupled with concern about 
the economic situation in Greece led the Dow to swing down more than 1000 points within 
a single day). 
 170. See, e.g., BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FINAL REPORT, POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS 7 (2012), available at 
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD392.pdf (explaining the first-mover 
advantage as “where investors have an incentive to redeem from a troubled MMF or at 
the first sign of market distress, since investors who redeem shares early will redeem on 
the basis of the stable NAV leaving the cost of any loss to be borne by the remaining 
shareholders”). 
 171. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 156, at 63 (explaining that the cost of 
liquidating assets, even if those assets have not declined in value, can cause a run to be 
“self-fulfilling”). This panic trading is not limited to financial assets. See Panic Buying of 
Salt in N. Bengal; No Shortage Assures Govt, BUS. STANDARD (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/panic-buying-of-salt-in-n-bengal-no-
shortage-assures-govt-113111500682_1.html (describing panic buying of salt based on 
rumors of a shortage). 
 172. But see Kirsten Grind, Gregory Zuckerman & Min Zeng, Billions Fly Out the 
Door at Pimco, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/billions-fly-out-
the-door-at-pimco-1411948188 (describing dramatic outflows at Pimco after departure of 
its cofounder and potential impact on bond market). 
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The situation in 2008 was distinctive for three reasons. First, the 
bankruptcy of Lehman generated substantial losses in the value of 
MMF assets—the Reserve Fund held 1.2% of its assets in Lehman 
short-term debt,173 which it wrote down to zero on September 16, 
2008.174 A loss of this size in money market assets was highly unusual. 
Second, the economic climate during the fall of 2008 put many MMF 
investors under economic pressure and, in particular, liquidity 
pressure, because of the freeze-up in the short-term credit markets.175 
This led MMF investors to withdraw funds to meet their cash flow 
needs. Third, non-Lehman events, including the bailout of Bear 
Stearns and the trouble at a number of other financial institutions 
including AIG, Wachovia, and Citigroup, created widespread concern 
about the quality (and possible default) of money market debt from 
other issuers.176 As a result, the MMFs that experienced a high 
volume of redemptions could not readily find buyers for their 
assets.177 
Both attributes of a run—panic trading and the first-mover 
advantage—are relevant to the causal relationship between breaking 
the buck and a run on MMFs. First, the act of breaking the buck may 
increase the salience to the market of the fact that MMFs do not 
guarantee the $1 share price.178 Once the risk of losing money 
becomes salient, investors may panic and withdraw their funds even 
from financially stable MMFs. These withdrawals tax the MMF’s 
liquidity, so that those who run slowly may be unable to withdraw 
their money.179 
In the case of an MMF, a stable $1 NAV aggravates the situation. 
So long as the MMF’s NAV is sufficiently high, investors can redeem 
at the $1 share price. But as the MMF’s NAV falls below $1 per share, 
 
 173. Complaint at 2, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Reserve Mgmt. Co., No. 09 CV 4346 
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2009); Gordon & Gandia, supra note 164, at 315. 
 174. Gullapalli, Anand & Maxey, supra note 2. 
 175. See The Credit Crisis, U. OF MARY WASHINGTON BLOG, 
http://www.2008financialcrisis.umwblogs.org/analysis/the-credit-crisis/ (last visited March 
21, 2015) (explaining that as the “lending markets dried up . . . businesses found it difficult 
or impossible to obtain the credit required to function normally”). 
 176. See INV. CO. INST., MONEY MARKET FUNDS IN 2012, MONEY MARKET FUNDS: 
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 (2012), available at 
www.ici.org/pdf/12_mmf_2008.pdf (describing factors contributing to MMF redemptions). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See, e.g., Patrick E. McCabe, The Cross Section of Money Market Fund Risks and 
Financial Crises 1–2 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working Paper No. 2010-51, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201051/201051pap.pdf (describing how the 
Reserve Fund’s breaking the buck “underlined the importance of money fund risks for 
MMF investors”). 
 179. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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investors can continue to redeem at $1 even if their share of the 
fund’s assets is somewhat less, as long as the NAV is above $0.995. 
These redemptions deplete the fund’s assets because redeeming 
investors are receiving more than their entitlement—the difference 
between the fund’s actual NAV and $1—and leaving even less for 
subsequent investors. These redemptions reflect the so-called 
arbitrage opportunity created by the $1 share price.180 Importantly, 
absent heavy redemption pressure, these small deviations between $1 
and the fund’s actual NAV do not deplete fund assets because the 
effect is offset by simultaneous purchases that also take place at $1 
per share. As a result, the gap has a meaningful effect on fund value 
only in situations in which redemption demand significantly outpaces 
purchases. The Reserve case exemplified this effect; early redeemers 
got out at $1 per share, and other investors received only 99 cents.181 
The third problem with MMFs is contagion effect. According to 
one view, the fact that a single MMF breaks the buck alerts the 
market to the fact that MMFs do not guarantee the $1 share price and 
may lead investors in other MMFs to redeem their shares even if the 
MMFs are independent financially.182 In reality, the situation is more 
complex. MMFs all hold similar assets—a collection of short-term 
debt instruments that include repurchase agreements, government 
securities, certificates of deposit (often from non-U.S. banks), and 
commercial paper.183 In recent years, financial firms have issued a 
substantial percentage of these instruments.184 If one MMF 
experiences financial distress, that distress may signal to the market a 
weakness in the assets held by many other MMFs. This correlation 
among portfolios, with a likely correlation in portfolio losses as well, 
produces a contagion effect.185 
Because an investor has the right to redeem her MMF shares on 
demand, a heavy volume of redemptions places liquidity demands on 
 
 180. See, e.g., Gordon & Gandia, supra note 164, at 324–25 (describing the arbitrage 
argument). 
 181. See Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& 
sid=a5O2y1go1GRU (reporting that investors who requested redemptions by 3:00 PM on 
September 16th would receive 100 cents on the dollar). 
 182. See, e.g., Gordon & Gandia, supra note 164, at 328 n.35. 
 183. See id. at 326. 
 184. See, e.g., FSOC Proposal, supra note 146, at 69,463 (noting that “[m]ost of the 
short-term financing that MMFs provide to non-governmental entities is extended to 
financial firms”). 
 185. Gordon & Gandia, supra note 164, at 328 n.35 (“The default of a money market 
security may lead investors at other funds to run not because they are trying to arbitrage a 
gap but because they want to avoid the realization of loss.”). 
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MMFs that must be met by a sale of assets. The assets that are sold 
may present little or no default risk and were likely purchased with 
the expectation that they would be held until maturity. Nonetheless, 
the need to generate cash may generate fire sale prices—meaning 
prices less than par value—even for non-distressed assets because 
active secondary markets do not exist for money market securities. 
Correlated distress among many MMFs may also lead to market 
imbalances because the redemption requests create a large number of 
sellers amid a limited supply of buyers. 
Once MMFs begin to sell assets at fire sale prices, the prices 
themselves generate a feedback effect in that they reduce the market 
price of the assets. When an MMF calculates its shadow NAV, it is 
required to mark its assets to market and therefore to incorporate the 
fire sale prices into its own NAV, even if it is not itself experiencing 
heavy redemptions. This decline in the shadow NAV may, once 
disclosed to investors, generate further redemptions. 
The 2010 changes to Rule 2a-7 increased the risk of contagion by 
reducing the pool of permitted investments for MMFs—both 
increasing quality requirements and reducing the permitted maturity 
for MMF assets.186 These changes caused each MMF’s portfolio to 
become more like those of other MMFs. This in turn increases the 
correlation among MMF values, which magnifies the potential for 
contagion if one MMF experiences financial distress. 
A run on MMFs may affect the overall economy, as was 
illustrated by the events that occurred during Lehman week. MMFs 
reduced their purchases of short-term money market assets and, in an 
effort to meet potential redemption requests, increased their holdings 
of cash.187 This reduced the availability of short-term credit to 
businesses.188 
 
 186. 2010 Final Rule, supra note 68, at 10,060; see also Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 
1022 (describing 2010 rule changes). 
 187. See Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 29 (2012) (statement of Mary 
L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch, Comm’n) (“During the last 2 weeks in 
September 2008, companies that issued short-term debt were largely shut out of the credit 
markets.”). 
 188. Id. 
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III.  THE 2014 REFORM 
A. The SEC’s 2014 MMF Rule 
On July 23, 2014, the SEC approved a final rule reforming MMF 
regulation by a divided 3-2 vote.189 Chair Mary Jo White explained 
that the reforms would “significantly mitigate[] the risks of a run in 
money markets funds and . . . limit further contagion should a run 
occur.”190 The other Commissioners were less sanguine.191 
Commissioner Aguilar, who voted in favor of the reform, described 
the rulemaking process as “one of [the] most flawed and 
controversial” ever undertaken by the SEC.192 
The new rule requires prime institutional MMFs to implement a 
floating NAV, but it exempts retail and government funds from this 
requirement.193 The rule authorizes boards of retail funds to 
implement gates and fees to discourage redemptions and provides 
that the power to use these tools is triggered by declines in fund 
liquidity.194 Finally, the rule adopts a new and narrow definition of 
 
 189. See Sarah Lynch, Split U.S. SEC Adopts Long-Awaited Money Market Fund 
Reforms, REUTERS (July 23, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/23/sec-
moneyfunds-vote-idUSL2N0PY1HP20140723. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 
47,736. The rule reflected, in substantial part, reforms proposed in the SEC’s rulemaking 
release issued on June 5, 2013. The 2013 release proposed a required floating NAV and 
gates and fees, stating that it might adopt either alternative or a combination of the two. 
2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,848. 
 190. Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at SEC Open 
Meeting on Money Market Fund Reform (2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/ 
Speech/1370542343041 [hereinafter White Statement]. 
 191. See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of 
Commissioner Kara M. Stein (2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 
1370542347012 [hereinafter Stein Statement] (identifying problems with the majority’s 
approach); Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open 
Meeting Regarding Money Market Fund Reform (2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech 
/Detail/Speech/1370542346300#.U9Zf4sJ0yiN [hereinafter Piwowar Statement] 
(identifying problems with the majority’s approach). 
 192. Jayne O’Donnell, SEC Ends $1 A Share for Some Money Funds, USA TODAY 
(July 23, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2014/07/23/sec-money-
funds-rules/13033749/. 
 193. Retail funds are defined as funds that have “policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to limit all beneficial owners of the fund to natural persons.” 2014 Final Rule, 
supra note 22, at 47,794. This was a change from the proposed rule, which would have 
defined retail funds as those that did not allow shareholders to redeem more than $1 
million in a single business day. 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,856. 
 194. In the final rule the fee and gate provisions are explicitly discretionary. A fund 
may impose such provisions, however, only when a fund’s weekly liquid assets drop below 
30% of its total assets. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,747. The 2010 
amendments already required MMFs to maintain 30% of their portfolios in weekly liquid 
assets. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(5)(iii) (2012); see 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,738; 
2010 Final Rule, supra note 68, at 10,113–14. 
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government MMFs,195 and exempts such MMFs from both the 
floating NAV and gates and fees provisions.196 
In addition to these structural changes,197 the new rule includes 
important new disclosure requirements. MMFs are required to 
provide extensive additional information on their websites.198 These 
requirements are supplemented by additional disclosures in the MMF 
prospectus and marketing materials,199 in Form N-CR,200 and in the 
statement of additional information (“SAI”).201 The requirements 
include disclosure of the fund’s current and historical market-based 
NAV calculated on a daily basis and rounded to four decimal 
points—the nearest one ten-thousandth of a cent.202 Funds are 
required to disclose any past use of gates and fees203 and historical 
sponsor support.204 Funds must also disclose current and historical 
information about the percentage of daily and weekly liquid assets in 
their portfolios as well as current and historical information about net 
shareholder inflows and outflows.205 
An important but little-mentioned effect of exempting retail 
funds from the requirement of a floating NAV is increased 
segmentation in the mutual fund market. To qualify as retail funds, 
funds can only permit individual persons to invest.206 In the capital 
markets generally, retail investors benefit from the market discipline 
 
 195. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,794 (“We therefore are revising the 
definition of a government fund to require that such a fund invest at least 99.5% (up from 
80% in the proposal) of its assets in cash, government securities, and/or repurchase 
agreements that are collateralized by cash or government securities.”). 
 196. Id. at 47,791–94. The exemption for government MMFs preserves such funds as a 
cash-management option for institutional investors. At the same time, it expands the 
number of funds that remain potentially vulnerable. As the SEC noted in the adopting 
release, government MMFs experienced substantial outflows in connection with the 2013 
debt ceiling impasse. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,746. In addition, the 
capacity of government MMFs to absorb the quantity of assets that will potentially 
migrate from institutional prime funds is unclear. See Letter from Wells Fargo Funds 
Mgmt., L.L.C., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Apr. 23, 2014), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-340.pdf. 
 197. The rule contained several additional features, including heightened 
diversification requirements and stress testing. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 
47,736. 
 198. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,827–34. 
 199. Id. at 47,815. 
 200. Id. at 47,838. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 47,829. The requirement that funds calculate and disclose a current market-
based NAV is not limited to floating NAV funds. Id. at 47,830. 
 203. Id. at 47,832. 
 204. Id. at 47,833. 
 205. Id. at 47,827–29. 
 206. Id. at 47,794. 
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imposed by more sophisticated institutional investors.207 With respect 
to mutual funds, institutions can impose market discipline that limits 
risk-taking and can impose competitive pressure on advisory fees.208 
Retail investors will lose this benefit if the funds in which they invest 
are limited to individual investors. 
Cognizant of the potentially substantial effect that its rule would 
have on the viability of MMFs and the secondary effect on the short-
term credit markets, the SEC provided that compliance dates for both 
the gates and fees provision and the floating NAV would not occur 
until two years after the effective date of the rule,209 although 
individual MMFs are permitted to implement them sooner.210 In 
addition, the new disclosure requirements for historical data are 
prospective only. According to Chair White, the new rule “will 
fundamentally change the way that most money market funds 
operate.”211 
B. Evaluating the Reforms 
The 2014 rule adopts a combination of liquidity gates and fees 
and a floating NAV, the two regulatory approaches that were the 
subject of the 2013 rule proposal.212 As indicated above, numerous 
commentators have weighed in on the feasibility and effectiveness of 
 
 207. See, e.g., Mark Perlow, Money Market Funds—Preserving Systemic Benefits, 
Minimizing Systemic Risks, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 74, 88 (2011) (explaining that retail 
investors benefit from the due diligence of institutions even if those institutions invest in 
different share classes). But see Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce 
Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the 
Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1034 (2005) (noting that 
segmentation of the mutual fund market already limits market discipline over funds sold 
primarily to retail investors). 
 208. Perlow, supra note 207, at 89. 
 209. The SEC itself acknowledged the concern that the regulatory change could itself 
trigger a run on MMFs. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,790–91 (“We 
acknowledge, as discussed in the Proposing Release and as noted by some commenters, 
that a transition to a new regulatory regime could itself cause the type of heavy 
redemptions that the amendments, including the floating NAV reform, are designed to 
prevent.”). 
 210. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,791. Various disclosure requirements are 
to be implemented sooner. See id. at 47,933. 
 211. White Statement, supra note 190. 
 212. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,747, 47,775; 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 
9, at 36,849, 36,878. The SEC noted in its releases the reasons for rejecting other reform 
proposals. For example, the SEC observed that the emergency liquidity facility required 
access to the federal discount window and that it lacked the authority to grant such access 
without authorizing legislation. 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,911. Similarly the 
SEC explained that required capital buffers would prove too costly. See id. at 36,907 (“The 
cost of diverting funds for this purpose represents a significant incremental cost of doing 
business for those providing the buffer funding.”). 
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the SEC’s 2013 proposals, and this Article will not reexamine those 
comments in detail. Instead, this Article will highlight several reasons 
why the rule is likely to be ineffective in addressing the SEC’s 
identified concerns about MMF fragility. In addition, the Article will 
identify key problems with the new disclosure requirements that 
commentators have largely overlooked. 
1.  The Floating NAV 
The central component of MMF reform proposals since the 
financial crisis has been requiring MMFs to float their NAV.213 I have 
argued elsewhere that a requirement that MMFs float their NAV is 
misguided.214 Under the new rule, the floating NAV requirement will 
only apply to a portion of existing MMFs: MMFs estimated by the 
SEC to hold almost $1.3 trillion in assets.215 The costs of moving to a 
floating NAV are substantial.216 The SEC’s rule was predicated on 
accounting and tax concessions to simplify compliance issues created 
by a floating NAV,217 but it is nonetheless likely that many, if not 
most, institutional investors will be unwilling or unable to use a 
floating NAV product.218 Because each purchase and redemption in 
such a fund will occur at a different price, investors will face the 
prospect of negative yields on a regular basis, making funds 
unsuitable for many types of investors.219 The SEC itself observes that 
 
 213. See Letter from Sheila Bair, Chair, Systemic Risk Council, to Elizabeth Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Sept. 16, 2013) (stating that “[t]he Stable NAV is the 
Cause of Money Market Funds’ Structural Weakness”); Unfinished Business: Money Fund 
Reform Lurks in Wake of Financial Crisis, INVESTMENT NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013, 9:35 AM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130905/FREE/130909961# (identifying a 
floating NAV as a “victory” for the Fed and the Treasury). 
 214. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1004–07. 
 215. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,900. 
 216. See, e.g., INST. CASH DISTRIBS., ICD COMMENTARY: OPERATIONAL AND 
ACCOUNTING ISSUES WITH THE FLOATING NAV AND THE IMPACT ON MONEY MARKET 
FUNDS 3–9 (July 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-40.pdf 
(reviewing the complexities associated with a floating NAV MMF); Letter from Ass’n for 
Fin. Prof’ls et al., to Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1–2 (July 2, 
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313.shtml (describing 
accounting, tax, and operational difficulties associated with a floating NAV and 
questioning whether the IRS can address these difficulties adequately); Letter from F. 
William McNabb III, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Vanguard, to the Fin. Stability 
Oversight Council 4 n.12 (Jan. 15, 2013), available at https://institutional.vanguard.com 
/iam/pdf/FSOCmoneyMKT_VG_ comment.pdf (citing comment letters to the SEC and 
other regulators opposing a floating NAV). 
 217. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,781–882. 
 218. See Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Inv. Co. 
Inst., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/11_sec_pwg_com.pdf. 
 219. Id. at 35. 
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it is impossible to estimate the extent to which the new rule will cause 
redemptions from institutional prime MMFs.220 These redemptions 
may greatly reduce the availability of short-term credit. In addition, 
institutional investors may shift their money into unregistered and 
potentially less stable investment alternatives.221 
Thus the floating NAV requirement is likely to impose 
substantial costs. The question for regulators is whether a floating 
NAV generates corresponding benefits in terms of improving MMF 
stability.222 Advocates of a floating NAV argue that a stable NAV 
creates an incentive for early redemption.223 They argue that a 
floating NAV addresses this problem because redemptions always 
take place at the fund’s true NAV.224 
Even defenders of a floating NAV recognize, however, that a 
floating NAV reduces the first-mover problem only to a limited 
degree. The SEC itself has noted the questionable efficacy of a 
floating NAV in reducing redemptions. As the SEC stated in the 
proposing release: 
[W]e expect that if a floating NAV had been in place, it could 
have mitigated some of the heavy redemptions that occurred 
due to the stable share price. Many factors, however, 
contributed to these heavy redemptions, and we recognize that 
a floating NAV requirement is a targeted reform that may not 
ameliorate all of those factors.225 
First, on a theoretical level, it is important to recognize that the 
arbitrage opportunity created by a fixed NAV only exists during the 
period in which the fund’s NAV has fallen below $1 but remains 
above $0.995. Once the fund must, by virtue of penny rounding, 
reduce its trading price to 99 cents, the arbitrage opportunity is 
reversed because purchasing shareholders can obtain, at a cost of 99 
cents per share, assets valued at more than that. Of course this effect 
 
 220. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,896. 
 221. See Letter from James A. McNamara & David Fishman, Managing Dirs., 
Goldman Sachs Asset Mgmt., to Kevin O’Neill, Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
3–4 (July 21, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-383.pdf 
[hereinafter Goldman Letter]. 
 222. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1155–56 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (faulting the SEC for failing to consider the economic consequences adequately 
when adopting the proxy access rule). 
 223. See 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,849 (describing the proposal to require 
floating NAV). 
 224. See FSOC Proposal, supra note 146, at 69,467 (explaining that floating NAV 
would reduce but not eliminate the first-mover advantage). 
 225. 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,850. 
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is purely theoretical in that only two MMFs in history have ever 
broken the buck, and no MMF has broken the buck but continued to 
operate as a going concern. 
Second, existing empirical evidence does not support the claim 
that a floating NAV reduces redemption pressure in a time of crisis. 
In 2008, ultra-short bond funds—the floating NAV alternative to 
MMFs—experienced comparable levels of redemptions to MMFs.226 
Indeed, the total assets invested in ultra-short bond funds declined by 
more than 60% from their peak in 2007 to the end of 2008.227 
Similarly, Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Gandia studied the 
difference in run rates in European MMFs during the financial crisis 
and found that none of the difference is explained by whether the 
NAV is fixed or floating.228 A likely explanation for these findings is 
that the same economic factors that cause investors to redeem from 
an MMF cause them to redeem from a floating NAV fund. Critically, 
redemption requests create an analogous first-mover advantage at 
floating rate funds as early redemptions can be satisfied through sales 
of the funds’ most liquid assets. 
The key factor contributing to redemption pressure is the stale 
pricing of mutual fund assets. When an investor redeems mutual fund 
shares, that redemption request must be honored on the basis of the 
current value of the MMF’s portfolio, calculated as of the 4:00 P.M. 
close.229 As noted above, however, the very fact of redemption may 
require a fund to sell assets at distressed prices, prices that will reduce 
the fund’s NAV.230 Because the typical fund will maintain a certain 
liquidity level in order to meet redemption requests, the sale of those 
assets will generally not take place until after the redemption and will 
therefore not be reflected in the price at which the redemption 
occurs.231 Thus, the claim that the investor in a floating-rate fund exits 
 
 226. See Letter from Samuel Hanson, Assistant Professor of Fin., Harvard Bus. Sch. et 
al., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Sept. 16, 2013) (“[T]he 
recent financial crisis witnessed widespread runs on MMF-like cash-management products 
with floating NAVs, including ultra-short bond funds in the US and variable NAV MMFs 
in Europe.”); Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1036. 
 227. Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 75 (2012) (statement of Paul 
Schott Stevens, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Inv. Co, Inst.). 
 228. Gordon & Gandia, supra note 164, at 350 (finding that “none of the contraction 
was explained by the difference between accumulating and stable NAV”). 
 229. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2014). 
 230. See supra notes 182–85. 
 231. Moreover, in a time of crisis, the inability to value distressed assets makes the 
fund’s calculation of NAV inherently unreliable. The court observed as much in the case 
of the Reserve Fund, finding that the Fund’s calculation of NAV on September 15 and 16, 
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at the fund’s true value is misstated—in times of heavy redemption, 
all funds face a first-mover advantage. 
Floating the NAV is likely to increase this redemption pressure 
because investors will then, on a regular basis, expect share prices to 
decline in response to various economic factors.232 In a stable-value 
fund, MMF managers face pressure to maintain the $1 NAV, and, 
anticipating that, investors do not expect an arbitrage opportunity to 
materialize. The empirical evidence indicates that this pressure is 
effective because the NAVs of MMFs fluctuated very little even in 
periods of substantial economic turmoil.233 The historical stability of 
MMFs’ NAVs belies the claim that a stable NAV is misleading or the 
result of a regulatory dispensation.234 MMFs trade at a $1 share price 
because their sponsors manage the portfolios in a way that minimizes 
any discrepancy between the underlying share value and a dollar. 
To eliminate the first-mover advantage, MMFs must do more 
than float their NAVs: they must satisfy redemption requests at fair 
value. For reasons described in further detail below, it is difficult to 
price MMF assets accurately.235 As a result, the floating NAV will 
require MMFs to sell and redeem shares based on “noisy 
guesstimates of true value.”236 These transactions have the potential 
to generate far greater unfairness between shareholders than the 
arbitrage opportunity to which the floating NAV is addressed. 
2.  Gates and Fees 
As with the floating NAV, the SEC’s Gates and Fees alternative 
appears poorly suited to address the central problem identified by 
regulators as justifying further reform—run risk. Indeed, as I have 
 
2008, was unreliable, even after the Fund broke the buck. See SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. 
(In re The Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig.), 673 F. Supp. 2d182, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 232. See Piwowar Statement, supra note 191, at 4 (“[E]ven if the NAV floats, 
sophisticated investors with significant money at stake that have a lower risk tolerance, the 
very investors at which the floating NAV is aimed, will still have incentive to redeem 
ahead of other investors.”). 
 233. See Frequently Asked Questions About the Pricing of U.S. Money Market Funds, 
INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.ici.org/mmfs/basics/faqs_ 
pricing_mmfs (reporting that “[a]verage per-share market values for prime money market 
funds . . . varied between $1.0020 and $0.9980 during the decade from 2000 to 2010.”). 
 234. See William A Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 1155, 1161 (arguing that the SEC has granted MMFs a regulatory subsidy that allows 
them to obfuscate their true value from investors). 
 235. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 236. Letter from James J. Angel, Assoc. Professor of Fin., Georgetown Univ., to U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-
13/s70313-228.pdf. 
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argued elsewhere, gates and fees potentially present a greater threat 
to MMF investors than a loss in principal because they jeopardize the 
investors’ immediate access to their funds.237 Immediate access is a 
key factor motivating investor use of MMFs.238 
One problem with the Gates and Fees alternative is its 
complexity. Cognizant of the fact that a mandatory gate or fee would 
likely be a strong negative for many investors, the SEC modified its 
Gates and Fees alternative from the proposing release to make the 
use of gates and fees discretionary rather than mandatory. The final 
rule empowers fund boards to impose liquidity fees of up to 2% or 
suspend redemptions (impose gates) for up to ten business days if a 
fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 30% of its total assets.239 At the 
same time, boards are required to impose a 1% liquidity fee if the 
fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 10% of its total assets unless the 
fund board decides that such a fee is not in the best interests of the 
fund.240 Thus the rule provides an opt-in for 2% gates and fees and an 
opt-out for 1% fees. The SEC failed to provide meaningful guidance 
on the “best interests” standard241 and in fact cited investor inability 
to predict the manner in which fund boards would exercise this 
discretion as a benefit.242 Without a clear indication as to the factors 
that a particular board will consider in imposing a gate or fee, it will 
be impossible for investors to price this risk in deciding whether to 
invest in an MMF. 
In addition, as Commissioner Kara Stein has noted, gates and 
fees are likely to be counterproductive both in addressing run risk and 
the greater problem of systemic contagion.243 Superficially, of course, 
gates and fees can reduce redemption pressure by making redemption 
more costly. If investors must pay a 1% or 2% fee to redeem their 
shares, they will be less willing to redeem. Similarly, while a gate is in 
effect, it completely prevents redemptions. Nonetheless, both gates 
and fees exacerbate run risk near the point of the trigger. Specifically, 
if investors are aware of the prospect of a draconian fee or complete 
bar on withdrawals, they may seek to redeem as the fund approaches 
 
 237. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 1046–48. 
 238. See Goldman Letter, supra note 221, at 1–3 (stating that MMF investors redeem 
early primarily out of a concern over loss of liquidity). 
 239. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,747. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 47,761. 
 242. Id. at 47,753. 
 243. See Stein Statement, supra note 191, at 3 (explaining why gates are “the wrong 
tool” to address run risk). 
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the trigger point for the imposition of the gate or fee.244 The result 
would be precisely the type of first-mover advantage that this Article 
has identified as a critical component of a run.245 
The incentive to run under a system with gates and fees would be 
more powerful than the arbitrage opportunity associated with penny-
rounding because the liquidity fees authorized under the rule are far 
greater than the 0.5% differential that the SEC identified as a 
concern under the status quo. Importantly as well, the fund board’s 
discretion as to whether to impose a gate or fee would generate 
uncertainty about any particular board’s willingness to do so.246 Under 
the final rule, the board’s power to impose gates and fees is triggered 
if a fund’s liquidity drops to twice the limit legally required by Rule 
2a-7,247 suggesting that boards will potentially be able to exercise this 
power with some frequency. This uncertainty could lead investors to 
redeem well in advance of any fund distress, in which case the 
investor redemptions, rather than economic developments, could 
cause the fund to fail. 
In addition, because an abrupt decline in liquidity would trigger 
the fund’s power to impose both gates and fees, gates and fees could 
be triggered by events that have nothing to do with the soundness of 
the fund or the quality of its assets.248 As Eric S. Rosengren, the 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston wrote in a comment 
letter to the SEC, gates and fees could be triggered simply by a few 
large investors in a fund withdrawing their money at the same time.249 
Rather than simply monitoring the quality of an MMF’s portfolio 
assets or the degree of risk undertaken by the MMF’s sponsor, 
investors would now have to worry about the behavior of their fellow 
 
 244. See Goldman Letter, supra note 221, at 2 (“To avoid payment of a fee or loss of 
liquidity of their investment as a result of a gate, investors can be expected to redeem 
shares of a money fund at the first sign of loss of liquidity.”). 
 245. See, e.g., Letter from Eric Rosengren, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. et al., 
to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter 
Rosengren Letter], available at www.bostonfed.org/news/press/2013/pr091213-letter.pdf 
(explaining that “investors could have an incentive to redeem before their fund breaches 
the WLA threshold” and terming this shortcoming “substantial”). 
 246. See, e.g., Gordon & Gandia, supra note 164, at 367 (explaining that the gates and 
fees alternative “disserves systemic stability because it does not establish clear 
expectations about loss realizations and loss absorption”). 
 247. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,747. 
 248. Although to be fair, rapid redemptions should not be a triggering event in the 
context of a strong market for money market assets because the MMF could restore its 
liquidity through sales. Such sales would, of course, be constrained by the limited trading 
that occurs in some money market assets, such as repurchase agreements. 
 249. Rosengren Letter, supra note 245, at 7. 
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investors and any significant demands that such behavior might 
impose on the fund’s liquidity. 
Moreover, a single fund’s imposition of a gate or fee could scare 
investors in other funds into redeeming to avoid facing a similar 
restriction. This would cause one MMF to generate a spillover effect 
on the industry.250 Given that the risk of panic may be highest among 
individual investors—who would also be least able to evaluate the 
fund’s disclosures in an effort to ascertain the likelihood that a gate or 
fee will actually be imposed—the use of gates and fees for retail 
MMFs is particularly problematic. Rosengren’s letter warns, “As this 
represents a new run mechanism that does not exist under the status 
quo, the fees-and-gates alternative may actually increase run risk 
relative to not enacting further reform.”251 Put differently, Sheila Bair, 
former FDIC Chair, observed that gates and fees create a new source 
of uncertainty—the type of uncertainty that generates a run—
uncertainty by investors about their ability to withdraw their 
money.252 
The biggest problem with gates and fees, however, is that mutual 
fund boards face powerful disincentives to use them. Although the 
circumstances under which the imposition of a gate or fee is 
warranted are likely to be extremely rare, imposing a gate or fee 
would irreparably damage the reputation not just of the MMF itself 
but of its sponsor too. Investors who have been subjected to a gate or 
fee are unlikely to continue to invest with that fund family in the 
future. Prospective investors will be wary of investing in a fund that 
has implemented such restrictions in the past and, under the new rule, 
MMFs will have to disclose any use of a gate or fee for the next ten 
years.253 In a highly competitive industry, there are reasons to believe 
that the use of gates or fees will limit a fund sponsor’s ability to 
attract investments to a degree that makes the survival of the sponsor 
questionable. This will be a major concern for a board considering the 
exercise of these powers. Although gates and fees may facilitate the 
liquidation of an irreparably damaged MMF,254 they are unlikely to be 
 
 250. See Goldman Letter, supra note 221, at 3 (explaining that gates and fees may lead 
to the very type of contagion the reform seeks to prevent). 
 251. Rosengren Letter, supra note 245, at 7. 
 252. Examining the SEC’s Money Mkt. Fund Rule Proposal: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
113th Cong. 54–55 (2013) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chair, Systemic Risk Council). 
 253. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,820. 
 254. I have argued elsewhere that a partial gate would be a useful tool for boards to 
use in circumstances in which it must break the buck. See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 1, at 
1046–48. Our proposal differs from the rule in that it would only impose a gate as a last 
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implemented for funds that are not terminal. As such, their value in 
enhancing MMF stability is questionable. 
3.  The New Disclosure Requirements 
True to the disclosure orientation of the federal securities laws,255 
the new rule adopts an extensive menu of additional required 
disclosures that offer independent reasons for concern.256 First, 
voluminous disclosure requirements may overwhelm investors and 
limit their ability to ascertain useful information about their 
investments.257 The problem of information overload is particularly 
apparent in mutual fund disclosure; commentators have observed for 
years that mutual fund regulation mandates too many disclosures that 
are of questionable value to investors.258 Most investors already 
complain that mutual fund disclosures are confusing and contain too 
much information,259 so much so that research conducted in 2006 
found that more than half of mutual fund investors read the fund 
prospectus very little or not at all, and only 8% read the prospectus in 
full.260 Moreover, because of the forced market segmentation between 
institutional and retail funds, retail investors will not benefit from the 
market discipline imposed by more sophisticated institutions that 
might use these disclosures more effectively.261 
Second, and perhaps more problematically, the disclosure is 
designed to make MMF portfolios, redemption requests, and liquidity 
levels more transparent, ostensibly to enable more effective investor 
 
resort and would limit the size of the gate so as to allow investors to redeem the majority 
of their funds without delay. 
 255. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Social Networks and the Securities Laws, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 1735, 1741 (2012) (“The federal securities laws do not focus on the merits of 
investments but rather are based on disclosure to allow sufficiently informed investors to 
fend for themselves.”). 
 256. The new disclosure and reporting requirements take up almost 200 pages of the 
adopting release, from page 288 to 485. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to 
Form PF, Securities Act Release No. 33-9616, 288–485 (Oct. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9616.pdf. 
 257. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003) (identifying the 
problem of information overload and explaining how too much disclosure can be 
counterproductive). 
 258. Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 303, 337 (2008). 
 259. SANDRA WEST & VICTORIA LEONARD-CHAMBERS, INV. CO. INST., 
UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR MUTUAL FUND INFORMATION 23 
(2006), available at www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_prefs_full.pdf. 
 260. Id. at 25. 
 261. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (explaining how the retail exemption 
will increase market segmentation). 
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monitoring. Yet, active investor monitoring of MMFs is of uncertain 
value. Apart from the question of whether MMF investors have the 
necessary skill set to evaluate MMF risk on the basis of the required 
disclosures, the private money aspect of MMF is in tension with a 
high level of information sensitivity. As Tri Vi Dang and others have 
argued in the context of bank secrecy, it may be desirable to maintain 
a level of information opacity for financial institutions that produce 
private money or money equivalents.262 
Of the new disclosure requirements, two are of particular 
concern. The first is the requirement that all MMFs calculate and 
disclose a market-based NAV on a daily basis.263 For floating value 
MMFs, this is the price at which the fund issues and redeems shares; 
for stable value MMFs, it is a shadow NAV.264 Importantly, the rule 
requires that, in both cases, the calculation be made to four decimal 
places or to the nearest ten thousandth of a cent.265 This high level of 
precision is explicitly designed to create an artificial appearance of 
volatility in a fund’s NAV. The SEC rejected imposing a precision 
requirement analogous to that used by other mutual funds, a NAV 
rounded to three decimal places,266 on the basis of empirical data 
showing that only with the more stringent disclosure requirement 
would MMF prices appear to fluctuate.267 
As a result, the disclosure conveys a false degree of price 
fluctuation. The ICI describes the SEC’s proposal as “an artificially 
sensitive pricing scheme to force ‘movement’ in the NAVs of the 
funds.”268 More troubling is the fact that the use of four decimal 
places suggests a scientific degree of accuracy to the valuation process 
that simply is not present.269 In fact, the opposite is true. As noted 
above, many of the assets held by MMFs rarely trade—they are held 
 
 262. See Tri Vi Dang et al., Banks as Secret Keepers 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20255, 2014) (defending bank opacity as efficient). 
 263. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,829–30. 
 264. Id. at 47,830 & n.1094. 
 265. Id. at 47,829. 
 266. Id. at 47,779 (acknowledging that the requirement is “a more precise standard 
than other mutual funds use today”). 
 267. Id. at 47,779–80 (reporting that, according to staff data, less than 5% of MMFs 
would have fluctuated in price during the three years between November 2010 and 
November 2013 under the standard applicable to other mutual funds). 
 268. Comment Letter from ICI to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 41 (Sept. 17, 2013), 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/13_ici_mmf_ltr.pdf. 
 269. Cf. Comment Letter from Presidents of the Fed. Reserve Banks to the 
Fin. Stability Oversight Council 1 (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/ 
news/press/2013/pr021213-letter.pdf (arguing that accurate market-based NAVs are a 
critical part of any reform option). 
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to maturity and rolled over.270 This means that when a fund calculates 
its NAV, current market prices for the securities may not be readily 
available.271 
In the absence of an available market price, funds are required to 
determine the “fair value” of the assets they hold.272 Fair value 
determinations are required for all investment funds, but the 
valuation methodology has a greater impact on funds that hold a large 
proportion of assets that do not have readily available market 
prices.273 Fair valuation methodology incorporates models, 
predictions and multi-factor tests.274 As a result, although MMF prices 
will be calculated to four decimal places, they will incorporate 
valuations that are not scientific but subjective and imprecise.275 
Concededly, the new rule reflects an important modification 
from the 2013 rule proposal—it authorizes stable NAV funds to 
 
 270. See infra Part I.A. 
 271. See Comment Letter from Catherine T. Dixon, Chair ABA Fed. Regulation of 
Sec. Comm., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 26 (Sept. 30, 
2013) [hereinafter Dixon Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-
13/s70313-249.pdf (explaining that, for most money market securities, there can be no 
secondary market prices because “there is no, or virtually no secondary market”). In 
addition, MMF boards may be faced with reflecting economic developments that affect 
liquidity but not default risk in MMF pricing, despite the absence of principles for making 
these judgments. An example is the pricing of money market assets, such as repurchase 
agreements, during the time that they are subject to the two-day stay applicable to 
qualified financial contracts of a systemically important finical institution (“SIFI’) that is 
subject to a resolution proceeding under Dodd-Frank. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie & David 
Skeel, A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and 
Repurchase Agreements, in BANKRUPTCY NOT BAILOUT: A SPECIAL CHAPTER 14, at 133, 
140–41 (Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor eds., 2012) (describing the two-day stay). 
While it is unclear how these assets should be priced during the stay, it is clear that the 
constraint on their liquidity cannot be ignored from a fair value perspective. 
 272. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 
Inv. Co. Rel. No. 26299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,718 n.21 (Dec. 24, 2003) (describing 
process of determining fair value). 
 273. See, e.g., Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of 
Portfolio Holdings, Investment Company Act Release No. 26418, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,300, 
22,304–05 (Apr. 23, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8408.htm 
(adopting amendments to Form N-1A and other registration forms and explaining “that 
funds are required to use fair value prices any time that market quotations for their 
portfolio securities are not readily available (including when they are not reliable)”). The 
release noted that MMFs were then subject to different pricing requirements under Rule 
2a-7. Id. at 22,305. 
 274. See Dixon Letter, supra note 271, at 26 (explaining that techniques for valuing 
MMF assets include “mark-to-model” pricing and “matrix pricing”). Both techniques 
provide relatively imprecise “estimates” of value, rather than true market value. 
 275. See, e.g., Ian McDonald & Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds’ Pricing Flaw, WALL ST. 
J. (Mar. 24, 2004), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB108007959483063307 (explaining 
that fair value pricing techniques “are only estimates and therefore can easily produce 
varying numbers”). 
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continue to use amortized cost valuation.276 Both fixed and floating 
NAV funds can also continue to use amortized cost valuation for 
portfolio securities with a remaining maturity of sixty days or less.277 
Importantly, however, the adopting release warns that funds can only 
use amortized cost valuation if the “board determines that the 
amortized cost of the security is fair value.”278 For the reasons noted 
above, this determination may prove challenging. A substantial 
proportion of Lehman’s borrowing, for example, was in the 
repurchase agreement market, and it is not clear when boards would 
have been required to value this debt at less than amortized cost as 
Lehman’s financial condition declined in 2008.279 An additional 
consequence of this concession is that it may drive MMFs to 
concentrate their portfolios to an even greater degree in the very 
shortest-term assets,280 with potentially significant effects for the 
distribution of demand for short-term credit. 
In addition, as noted above, mutual fund pricing is inevitably 
stale because it does not account for the effect of pending economic 
developments and redemption requests that will affect the value of 
securities that must be sold to meet pending redemption requests.281 
Given that floating NAV funds will need to trade at these stale prices, 
the valuation methodology creates the potential for substantial intra-
shareholder disparities. 
The difficulty of accurately computing fair value282 and the 
potential liability exposure associated with a failure to do so were 
 
 276. See 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,736 (explaining the importance of 
amortized cost valuation for intraday liquidity). 
 277. Id. at 47,812. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See, e.g., Peter Eavis, Lessons of Lehman’s Flighty Funding, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7. 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703713504575475532391301148 
(citing Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s findings about Lehman’s repurchase 
agreement exposure). It is also unclear how a fund board could have made this 
determination given the expectation by many market participants that the government 
would rescue Lehman. See William O. Fisher, Predicting a Heart Attack: The Fundamental 
Opacity of Extreme Liquidity Risk, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 465, 498–504 (2014) (explaining 
that neither credit rating agencies nor the CDs market recognized Lehman’s growing 
liquidity risk during 2008). 
 280. MMF holdings are already concentrated in very short-term debt. For example, the 
SEC stated that, as of February 2014, approximately 56% of the assets of prime MMFs 
had maturities of sixty days or less. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,812 n.874. 
 281. See supra text accompanying notes 231–36. 
 282. The SEC recognized the challenges of determining a market-based NAV in its 
adopting release; indeed, it devoted an entire section of the release to providing additional 
guidance on the topic of fair valuation. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,812. 
Unfortunately, the guidance left much to be desired. The guidance reminded fund boards 
that their duty to determine whether prices constituted fair value is nondelegable but 
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recently demonstrated in the Morgan Keegan case.283 The five 
Morgan Keegan bond funds at issue, like MMFs, held fixed-income 
securities that were rarely traded. As a result, the funds had to 
determine fair value for securities that constituted more than 60% of 
the funds’ assets.284 The SEC brought proceedings against the funds, 
their employees, and their board of directors for failing to apply 
appropriate procedures to calculate the funds’ NAV.285 Although 
Morgan Keegan is an extreme case in that, according to the SEC, the 
funds’ valuations were fraudulently manipulated,286 the litigation 
illustrates the complexity of the fair value determination.287 
The SEC’s new rule also imposes troubling requirements with 
respect to the disclosure of sponsor support, reflecting the SEC’s view 
that sponsor support contributes to the fragility of MMFs.288 The 
provisions seek to reduce investor reliance on the possibility of 
sponsor support and to increase the disincentive for sponsors to 
provide such support. These objectives are troubling in that sponsor 
support has historically been a key factor enhancing MMF stability. 
 
highlighted the potential value of third-party pricing services in assisting the board in this 
determination. Id. In light of the controversy associated with reliance on third parties in 
the context of credit rating agencies and proxy advisors, the SEC’s suggestion of 
regulatory approval for this reliance is surprising. See, e.g., SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 
(IM/CF) (June 30, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm 
(providing guidance on when institutional investors may reasonably rely on voting 
recommendations supplied by third-party proxy advisors). 
 283. J. Kenneth Alderman, Investment Company Act Release No. 30300, 105 SEC 
Docket 693 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/ic-
30300.pdf.  
 284. Id. 
 285. See, e.g., Order Making Findings and Imposing a Cease and Desist Order 
Pursuant to Section 9(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 30557, 2013 WL 2646182 (June 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/ic-30557.pdf [hereinafter Morgan Keegan Order] 
(announcing settlement of enforcement proceeding against eight Morgan Keegan 
directors). 
 286. Morgan Asset Management, Inc. et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 
29704, 101 SEC Docket 1369 (June 22, 2011). 
 287. See Morgan Keegan Order, supra note 285 (describing deficiencies in valuation 
procedures employed by the directors). See generally An Introduction to Fair Valuation, 
INV. CO. INST. (Spring 2005), http://www.idc.org/pdf/05_fair_valuation_intro.pdf 
(providing guidance on fair value determination). 
 288. See, e.g., Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 29 (2012) (statement of Mary 
L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (noting that “100 funds were bailed 
out by their sponsors during September 2008”); see also Sean Collins, Is SEC Data 
Misleading the Public on Sponsor Support of Money Market Funds?, ICI VIEWPOINTS 
BLOG (June 21, 2012), http://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_12_mmfs_fund_support 
(explaining that the provision of sponsor support does not mean an MMF is in danger). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 935 (2015) 
978 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
To achieve the first objective, the rule requires MMFs to inform 
prospective investors that “[t]he Fund’s sponsor has no legal 
obligation to provide financial support to the Fund, and you should 
not expect that the sponsor will provide financial support to the Fund 
at any time.”289 The SEC explains that this language is designed to 
“emphasize to investors that they should not expect a fund sponsor to 
provide financial support.”290 Although, under current law, the 
statement is certainly factually accurate, given the historical 
willingness of sponsors to provide such support, it is not clear what 
message investors are to take from this emphasis. 
The message is particularly confusing in the context of the 
additional new requirement that sponsors disclose all prior instances 
in which they have provided support over the past ten years.291 One 
possible reading of the disclosures is that investors should ignore the 
statement about legal obligation because this sponsor has historically 
gone beyond its obligations and voluntarily provided support. 
Another possible implication is that, despite the sponsor’s past 
practice of providing support when necessary, this support is not to be 
trusted. 
Beyond these mixed messages is the question of how investors 
should interpret a sponsor’s prior practice of providing support. On 
the one hand, the disclosure might mean that the sponsor has stood 
behind its fund and has the financial wherewithal to do so. 
Alternatively, the fact that a fund required prior sponsor support 
might signal that it is poorly managed or takes excessive risks. Absent 
some meaningful indication of what sponsor support means, it is 
difficult to understand how investors can use this information to make 
informed investment choices.292 
Regardless of the effect of the signal, requiring sponsors to 
disclaim financial responsibility for a fund’s NAV may reduce their 
willingness to assume such responsibility. Once a sponsor is forced to 
tell investors that it need not provide support, it may be unwilling to 
provide such support voluntarily. Similarly, in the face of a detailed 
disclosure requirement that will extend for the next ten years, 
 
 289. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,816. The statement also adds language 
warning investors of the possibility that the fund will impose gates and fees. Id. 
 290. Id. at 47,817. 
 291. Id. at 47,824. 
 292. The SEC itself indicated some confusion as to this point. See id. at 47,825. 
(explaining that “[t]he disclosure of affiliate sponsor support could have additional effects 
on capital formation, depending on whether investors interpret financial support as a sign 
of money market fund strength or weakness”). 
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sponsors may be less willing to provide support in the face of 
weakness or may delay providing support in hopes that it will prove 
unnecessary rather than acting promptly before investors become 
concerned. Either way, MMF stability is reduced. 
IV.  MANDATORY SPONSOR SUPPORT—A NEW APPROACH TO MMF 
REFORM 
A. A Proposal for Mandatory Sponsor Support 
As noted above, the SEC’s long-awaited reforms are unlikely to 
increase MMF stability and may, in fact, be counterproductive. 
Accordingly, this Article offers a new approach to MMF reform—
mandated sponsor support of the $1 share price. This Article 
proposes that the SEC amend Rule 2a-7 to require sponsors of stable-
value MMFs to support the $1 share price. Sponsors would be 
required to commit to support as a condition for offering a stable-
value NAV MMF. Put differently, the proposal would provide MMF 
sponsors with a choice. Sponsors could continue to offer a stable 
NAV MMF, but if they did so, they would be required to commit to 
maintain the $1 share price. Alternatively, sponsors could offer a 
floating NAV MMF, which could be regulated in accordance with the 
2014 rule.293 
The Article’s rationale for embracing sponsor support is the 
critical structural difference between MMFs and banks. MMFs, like 
other investment funds, consists of a pool of assets that are segregated 
from the assets of their sponsors. Redemptions from an MMF are 
made from the MMF’s assets, not from the sponsor’s assets. Although 
the MMF sponsor manages the fund, its financial structure is linked to 
the MMF only to the extent that it receives fees for the services 
provided to the MMF. 
As John Morley has explained, this separation of investments 
and management is an important and efficient feature of mutual 
funds because it critically changes the risk exposure of mutual fund 
investors, who are not exposed to the general operational risks of the 
mutual fund sponsor.294 The separation also means that, as a general 
rule, sponsor assets are not available to MMF investors. Sponsor 
support is an exception to this traditional separation because it makes 
sponsor assets available to MMF investors in the event of MMF 
 
 293. Although this Article does not favor a floating NAV, it retains the floating NAV 
to broaden the pool of potential MMF sponsors beyond those who could commit credibly 
to provide adequate support. 
 294. Morley, supra note 30, at 1228, 1258–59. 
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distress. Critically, sponsor support is conceptually possible only 
because the assets of the sponsor are an independent resource rather 
than part of the MMF’s portfolio value. 
Banks, in contrast, lack this separation of investments and 
management. Bank deposits are a loan from the depositor to the 
bank, and depositors look to the general assets of the bank to satisfy 
this obligation. The bank’s financial fragility therefore poses a risk to 
depositors, and this risk is the source of bank runs. Banks lack an 
analogous option of sponsor support because the bank’s resources 
already stand behind its obligations, and there is no additional pool of 
assets to supplement those resources. 
Experience has demonstrated the effectiveness of sponsor 
support for MMFs that faced substantial redemptions or other forms 
of financial distress. The SEC staff reported that, during the critical 
2007–2008 time frame, almost 20% of all money market funds 
received sponsor support or SEC no-action approval of such 
support.295 According to Moody’s, at least 145 MMFs received 
sponsor support prior to 2007.296 Brady, Anadu, and Cooper 
documented seventy-eight funds that received direct sponsor support 
during the 2007–2011 time frame.297 
Importantly, sponsor support increases price stability.298 The 
prevalence of sponsor support explains why MMFs so rarely break 
the buck. As McCabe demonstrates, for example, sponsor support 
was highly effective in stabilizing MMFs during the asset-backed 
commercial paper crisis of 2007, and no MMF broke the buck.299 
McCabe also demonstrates that, after the Reserve Fund broke the 
buck, MMFs with weaker sponsors experienced higher levels of 
redemptions.300 
Sponsors have provided support to their MMFs in multiple ways. 
One of the most common—and the most frequently overlooked—is 
through discretionary fee waivers.301 Although MMF advisory fees are 
 
 295. 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,840 n.45. 
 296. See Henry Shilling, Sponsor Support Key to Money Market Funds, MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERVICE 3 (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.alston.com/files/docs/Moody's_ 
report.pdf (describing various types of sponsor support). 
 297. Steffanie A. Brady, Ken E. Anadu & Nathaniel R. Cooper, The Stability of Prime 
Money Market Mutual Funds: Sponsor Support from 2007 to 2011, at 4 (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, Working Paper 2012), available at 
http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/. 
 298. See McCabe, supra note 178, at 1–2. 
 299. Id. at 8. 
 300. Id. at 35. 
 301. The fact that even the SEC has overlooked the importance of fee waivers is 
demonstrated by the fact that its new disclosure requirement for sponsor support does not 
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set by contract, fund managers have the discretion to waive the fees in 
whole or in part, and fund managers regularly do so.302 Fee waivers do 
not require approval from the fund’s board or the SEC.303 These 
waivers have the effect of shifting capital from the investment advisor 
to the fund itself. Fee waivers have been common for many years; the 
practice long predates the financial crisis.304 Susan Christoffersen 
found that, for example, between 1991 and 1995, over half of retail 
MMFs and nearly 80% of institutional MMFs waived all or part of 
their fees.305 
The extent to which MMFs have used fee waivers has increased 
dramatically since the financial crisis. Since 2008, MMFs waived a 
total of $24 billion in fees.306 In 2013 alone, MMF fee waivers totaled 
$5.8 billion.307 A key reason for the fee waivers is the low interest 
rates that are currently available on money market assets—absent fee 
waivers, the funds would generate negative returns.308 
The widespread use of fee waivers demonstrates the willingness 
of fund sponsors to forgo profits and to absorb virtually all the 
expenses of operating the funds.309 By waiving their fees, managers 
are transferring the waived amount to the funds to support their 
NAVs, and absorbing the funds’ losses on behalf of the funds’ 
investors.310 Importantly, by structuring sponsor support as a fee 
 
include fee waivers. 2014 Final Rule, supra note 22, at 47,822 n.990. Technically the 
exclusion is for “routine” fee waivers, but the release does not define the term routine. Id. 
 302. See, e.g., Susan Christoffersen, Why Do Money Fund Managers Voluntarily Waive 
Their Fees?, 56 J. FIN. 1117, 1119–25 (2001) (providing data on the frequency and extent of 
voluntary fee waivers by MMFs). 
 303. Id. at 1119. 
 304. See id. (stating that “[f]und managers have used fee waivers since the late 1970s”). 
 305. Id. at 1139. 
 306. Tim McLaughlin, U.S. Stock Fund Costs Fall; Money Market Fee Waivers Hit $5.8 
Bln, REUTERS (May 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/funds-stocks-
fees-idUSL1N0NZ13320140514 (citing study by the Investment Company Institute). 
 307. Id. By way of comparison, total fee waivers in 1995 were $348 million. See 
Christoffersen, supra note 302, at 1120. 
 308. McLaughlin, supra note 306; see also Brett Philbin, Schwab’s Profit Falls 20% on 
Lower Fees, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
schwabs-profit-falls-20-on-lower-fees-2012-04-16 (explaining that Schwab was waiving fees 
on MMFs “so that client yields don’t turn negative”). 
 309. See McLaughlin, supra note 306 (“Money market fund advisers and their 
distributors pay for waivers, forgoing profits and bearing nearly all of the expense of 
running the funds.”). 
 310. See Sam Mamudi, Schwab Results Highlight Money-Market Fund Hit, 
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/money-market-fee-
waivers-hit-schwab-top-line-2010-04-15 (reporting that Charles Schwab lost $125 million in 
first quarter revenues due to MMF fee waivers in 2010); Philbin, supra note 308 
(explaining that MMF fee waivers had caused Schwab’s reported profit to fall by 20%). 
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waiver, in which the fund manager has a contractual entitlement to a 
payment and then voluntarily and discretionarily waives that 
payment, MMFs avoid the accounting and regulatory complications 
that would accompany an explicit guarantee or ex-ante commitment. 
Although current fee waivers are informal, discretionary, and largely 
clandestine, they demonstrate the viability of sponsor support in 
enhancing MMF stability. 
In addition to fee waivers, sponsors provide support by 
purchasing distressed assets from a fund at amortized cost, providing 
direct injections of capital or liquidity, or providing letters of 
indemnity or other types of guarantees.311 As history demonstrates, 
sponsors have a strong incentive to support their MMFs. Breaking the 
buck could irreparably damage a sponsor’s reputation and make it 
unable to continue to operate.312 Importantly, for the vast majority of 
sponsors, MMFs represent only a small proportion of their overall 
business, and the spillover effect could destroy the sponsors’ other 
operations as well.313 
Sponsor support is not costly in the context of most sponsors’ 
overall operations. MMFs generally constitute a small percentage of 
the sponsor’s assets under management,314 and the potential cost of 
furnishing support to the funds is a tiny portion of the sponsor’s 
independent value. BlackRock, for example, manages approximately 
$300 billion in MMF products, out of a total of more than $4 trillion in 
 
 311. Shilling, supra note 296, at 3. 
 312. See, e.g., Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 52, at 3 (“[F]und sponsors with more 
non-money market fund business expect to incur large costs if their money market funds 
fail. Such costs . . . could be outflows from other mutual funds managed by the same 
sponsor or a loss of business in the sponsor’s commercial banking, investment banking, or 
insurance operations.”); McCabe, supra note 178, at 6 (“[B]ecause allowing a fund to 
break the buck would have been destructive to a sponsor’s reputation and franchise, 
sponsors backstopped their funds voluntarily.”). 
 313. Comment Letter from James J. Angel, Assoc. Professor of Fin., Georgetown 
Univ., to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (Feb. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-410.pdf (“Sponsors have a strong 
commercial incentive to stand behind their funds. Breaking the buck means the immediate 
and catastrophic end of the sponsor’s entire asset management business.”). 
314. For the Reserve Primary Fund, of course, the proportion was much higher, as it is 
for sponsors like Federated. See Sam Mamudi & Jonathan Burton, Money Market Breaks 
the Buck, Freezes Redemptions, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 17, 2008, 9:11 AM), 
www.marketwatch.com/story/money-market-fund-breaks-the-buck-freezes-redemptions 
(“The Reserve [was] solely a money market shop, it didn't have the resources to bail out 
Primary Fund in the way a diversified mutual-fund giant . . . would be able.”). So, too, is 
the case for sponsors like Federated. FEDERATED INVESTORS, INC., 2013 ANNUAL 
REPORT 10 (2014), available at http://corp.federatedinvestors.com/FII/daf/pdf/annual 
_report/2013_Annual_Report.pdf. 
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assets under management.315 BlackRock has an independent value of 
$51 billion, meaning that $51 billion of value from the sponsor’s 
shareholders is available to meet the potential demands of its 
MMFs.316 In essence, BlackRock’s market capitalization provides a 
capital buffer of 17%. In addition, MMF sponsors receive a 
percentage of the total assets under management in the form of 
regular and highly liquid advisory fees.317 These fees provide a ready 
source of liquidity upon which the sponsor can draw to meet its 
support obligations.318 Indeed, even in an era in which MMF yields 
have plummeted, MMF sponsors continue to receive substantial fee 
income.319 
In addition, sponsor support offers flexibility. As they have done 
in the past, sponsors could waive advisory fees, in whole or in part, to 
prevent the fund from experiencing a negative yield. Sponsors could 
commit up front to provide support through an explicit guarantee or 
letter of credit or could purchase private insurance to cover any 
potential liability. Alternatively, if a fund experiences financial 
weakness, a sponsor could provide liquidity by purchasing MMF 
assets at par, exchanging assets, or injecting capital into the MMF. 
Under current law, sponsor support is always discretionary.320 
Discretionary sponsor support is widely characterized as a weakness 
 
 315. The Monolith and the Markets, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2013, at 25, 25–26, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21591164-getting-15-trillion-assets-single-risk-
management-system-huge-achievement. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See Tim McLaughlin, Big US Money Funds’ Fees Outpace Investor Returns, 
REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/29/funds-
moneymarket-idUSL2E8ESW1820120329. 
 318. For example, the $116 billion Fidelity Cash Reserves Fund generated $200 million 
in income for its sponsor in each of the three years from 2010 to 2012. Thus the fund’s 
annual income greatly exceeded the degree of fluctuation in value targeted by the SEC’s 
rules as a cause for concern. See id. 
319. See id. (observing that big MMF sponsors saw far less of a decline in fees than 
investors saw in returns). 
 320. Various legal rules prevent sponsors from guaranteeing fund value in advance, 
including limitations on affiliate transactions, requirements for reporting contingent 
liabilities, consolidation requirements and, for regulated entities, a concern about 
extending the federal safety net to a nonbank entity. See SEC Staff Issues Clarification on 
Consolidation Issues Relating to Bank Support for Money Market Funds, ERNST & 





vRU-fUZOA4luXCRWCtA. In September 2008, the SEC staff issued guidance to clarify 
that banks were not required to consolidate the fund on their balance sheet if they 
provided discretionary support in connection with the financial crisis. U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
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of MMFs, because of the fear that the sponsor may fail to provide 
support in time of crisis and allow the MMF to fail.321 This Article’s 
proposal would modify Rule 17a-9 to require sponsor support rather 
than making such support voluntary.322 
Critically, in order to allow a sponsor to commit to these forms of 
support up front, the SEC would need to modify the rules on affiliate 
transactions, calculation of NAV, and consolidation, where 
necessary.323 Because, under this proposal, sponsor support would be 
a contingent liability, the mandate would regularize the accounting 
treatment of measures taken by a sponsor to provide for such support 
in advance, such as through the creation of reserves. 
Mandating sponsor support would address former Chairman 
Schapiro’s concern about the unreliability of sponsor support in a 
time of crisis.324 To address the related concern about transparency, 
this Article proposes several complementary disclosure requirements. 
MMFs would be required, on a real-time basis, to disclose the extent 
and form of support provided.325 MMFs would also be required to 
disclose any conditional forms of support including insurance 
 
Comm’n, SEC Issues Clarification on Accounting Issues Relating to Bank Support for 
Money Market Mutual Funds, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 17, 2008), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-205.htm. Similarly, accounting rules limit the 
ability to segregate assets to cover potential losses in the form of a reserve because the 
sponsor has no obligation to cover those losses. Although accounting rules would allow 
reserves if the sponsor guaranteed its MMF losses in advance, such a guarantee would 
subject the sponsor to disclosure obligations and possible consolidation. See PWG 
REPORT, supra note 121, at 10. In addition, an explicit guarantee could arguably be 
treated as an asset of the fund, with the resulting requirement that it be reflected in the 
fund’s NAV. 
 321. See Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 90, at 735 (attributing weakness of MMFs, in 
part to “discretionary sponsor support instead of formal capital buffers or insurance”); 
Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, Fragility in Money Market Funds: Sponsor Support and 
Regulation 1 (July 12, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2295145 (describing voluntary sponsor support as both instrumental to 
maintaining a stable NAV and, at the same time, a source of MMF “fragility”). The failure 
of the Reserve Fund followed this fact pattern. As one paper observes, “[I]t was the lack 
of sponsor support . . . that was more unusual than the underlying losses suffered.” Brady, 
Anadu & Cooper, supra note 297, at 2. 
 322. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-9 (2014). 
 323. See supra note 320 (describing existing legal impediments to mandatory sponsor 
support). 
 324. See Mary Schapiro, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at SIFMA’s 2011 
Annual Meeting (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch110711mls.htm 
(expressing concern that “support may be there, or it may not. And there certainly is no 
current legal requirement that sponsor support or any other back-up exist”). 
 325. MMFs would be required to disclose all forms of support, including fee waivers. 
Unlike the current rule, the proposal would not require sponsors to disclose the reason for 
providing support, as the reasons—supporting the fund’s NAV and supplying liquidity—
are implicit in the regulatory mandate. 
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coverage, contingent purchases, and third-party guarantees. 
Importantly, these disclosures would not have the potential adverse 
consequences of the requirements included in the 2014 rule because, 
in a regulatory environment in which sponsor support is mandated, 
disclosure that the sponsor has provided such support would not be a 
confusing signal about the need for support or the sponsor’s 
willingness to provide support in the future. 
In addition to this disclosure, MMF sponsors would have to 
provide disclosures about their financial condition. For sponsors that 
regularly provide current financial information to the public, either 
through capital markets disclosures or publicly available filings with 
regulators, such information would be sufficient. Private sponsors that 
are not otherwise subject to mandated financial disclosure, like the 
Reserve Management Company or Fidelity, would be required to 
provide analogous periodic disclosures to allow investors to evaluate 
their capacity to meet the support requirement. 
B. Advantages of Mandatory Sponsor Support over Current Law 
Mandatory sponsor support is a better approach than the 2014 
rule for three reasons. The first reason is that sponsor support has 
been remarkably successful in preventing MMFs from breaking the 
buck, thereby preventing investor losses and avoiding the contagion 
effect associated with a run.326 As the SEC and others have 
documented, sponsors supported the NAVs of their MMFs for 
years.327 Sponsor support has enabled hundreds of MMFs to weather 
the turmoil of the financial crisis of 2008, the European Debt crisis, 
uncertainty about the U.S. debt ceiling, the SIV issue, and more, 
without breaking the buck. 
Notably, a commitment to sponsor support reduces run risk 
because it eliminates the pressure for investors to redeem. As a result, 
in most circumstances the guarantee alone will be sufficient to 
provide stability without requiring the sponsor to incur substantial 
cost. The effectiveness of a guarantee is illustrated by the federal 
government’s temporary guarantee during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Although the government provided nominal insurance of MMF 
assets, it never paid out any money—sponsor support enabled all the 
 
 326. See Brady, Anadu & Cooper, supra note 297, at 1 (documenting the effectiveness 
of sponsor support in preventing MMFs from breaking the buck despite economic stress). 
 327. See supra notes 295–312 and accompanying text. 
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funds other than the Reserve Fund to weather the Lehman default 
without breaking the buck.328 
The second benefit to mandatory sponsor support is that it 
requires the sponsor, which controls the MMF’s investment decisions, 
to internalize the costs of those decisions. Unlike a government 
bailout, sponsor support means that the sponsor pays, not the 
taxpayer. As a result, required sponsor support eliminates the moral 
hazard problem and instead provides optimal incentives for sponsors 
to minimize portfolio risk.329 One of the ongoing concerns about 
MMFs is the potential that sponsors will take excessive risk to 
increase yield and obtain a competitive advantage.330 Although the 
SEC’s 2010 MMF reforms reduce the degree of permissible risk-
taking, so long as the sponsor does not bear the full costs of its risk-
taking, it will have an incentive to take excessive risk. Moreover, this 
appetite for risk is likely to be concentrated in those MMF sponsors 
that are financially fragile or those that lack independent business 
reasons for maintaining a sound MMF. Both these concerns about the 
sponsor’s incentives for risk-taking, however, which arguably affect 
the value of the sponsor’s commitment, are highly transparent to 
MMF investors. Thus, to the extent that sponsor support reduces the 
independence of an MMF’s portfolio from the financial stability of its 
sponsor, market forces should lead investors to prefer MMFs offered 
by those sponsors that most credibly can stand behind the MMF’s 
share price.331 
 
 328. See Letter from Paul Scott Stevens to the Editor of Am. Banker (Oct. 18, 2012), 
available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/money-market-funds-US-guarantee-
was-limited-and-temporary-1053607-1.html (explaining that the Temporary Guarantee 
Program did not pay out a single claim but generated $1.2 billion in fee revenue from 
participating MMFs). 
 329. Importantly, unlike capital buffers, sponsor guarantees would not provide a 
discontinuity with respect to sponsor incentives. With required capital buffers, a sponsor’s 
incentive to take risk increases as potential losses approach the size of the buffer because 
the sponsor will not bear the cost of losses beyond the amount of the buffer. Thus capital 
buffers create a distortion analogous to that created by low capital requirements for banks. 
 330. For example, commentators described the Reserve Fund’s risk taking as excessive, 
noting that in September 2008, the Reserve Fund’s twelve-month yield was “the highest 
among more than 2,100 money funds tracked, according to Morningstar.” Steve Stecklow 
& Diya Gullapalli, A Money-Fund Manager’s Fateful Shift, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2008), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122869788400386907. This yield made the Fund an 
attractive investment—“the fund’s assets tripled in two years to $62.6 billion.” Id. 
 331. Indeed, Patrick McCabe finds that investors are capable of distinguishing among 
MMF sponsors; he shows that the MMFs associated with risky sponsors experienced a 
higher level of institutional redemptions during recent economic crises. See McCabe, supra 
note 178, at 34. 
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Third, sponsor support does not create the moral-hazard 
problem associated with external financial support such as a private 
liquidity facility or an industry-wide insurance or guarantee system 
because each sponsor is individually responsible for the stability of its 
own funds.332 Sponsors that take excessive risk with their MMF 
portfolios cannot draw upon resources contributed by more 
conservative sponsors. Similarly, because MMFs would be looking to 
their individual sponsors for support rather than a common pool, the 
contagion effect of individual MMF fragility would be contained. 
Even if a particular sponsor experienced financial distress, that 
distress would have a limited effect on investors’ expectations about 
the stability of other funds. 
C. Possible Objections and Responses 
The most likely objection to this Article’s proposal might be, if 
mandatory sponsor support is such a good idea, why hasn’t someone 
proposed it?333 In light of the extensive debate over MMF reform, it 
would seem that regulators and commentators have already identified 
and debated all viable options. The answer to this question is that the 
viability of sponsor guarantees has been masked by the political 
dynamic in which MMF reform has been debated. Commentators 
have described MMFs as shadow banks, termed the 2008 redemptions 
a run akin to bank runs, and proposed reforms, such as capital 
buffers, designed to make MMFs more like banks.334 As noted above, 
mandatory sponsor support is only possible because of the unique 
separation of management and investments in MMFs, a separation 
that does not exist in a traditional bank. 
Politically, sponsor guarantees are also an unattractive option for 
both key interest groups—banks and mutual fund sponsors. From the 
 
 332. See, e.g., Shah Gilani, Money Market Funds Are in the Fight of Their Lives, 
MONEY MORNING (Feb. 9, 2012), http://moneymorning.com/2012/02/09/money-market-
funds-are-in-the-fight-of-their-lives/ (“From the moral hazard perspective, critics point to 
the Fed’s backstopping money market funds as a license for them to take more risks as 
they divert deposits from the more regulated banking system.”). 
 333. Twenty years ago, Howell Jackson proposed a conceptually similar alternative to 
increased regulation of financial holding companies. Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding 
Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507, 583 (1994). Jackson 
argued, analogously to the arguments raised in this Article, that “[p]articularly, in the 
depository institution field, where illiquid assets and severe informational asymmetries 
complicate traditional forms of risk-regulation by government agencies, holding company 
guarantees are a promising innovation in regulatory structure.” Id. at 513. Much of 
Jackson’s reasoning can be applied to the context of MMFs. 
 334. See FSOC Proposal, supra note 146, at 69,456 (recommending required capital 
buffers of either 1% or 3%). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 935 (2015) 
988 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
perspective of banks, sponsor guarantees highlight the difference 
between banks and MMFs by tapping a source of financial stability 
that banks cannot replicate. To the extent that MMFs offer an 
attractive, competitive product, explicit sponsor guarantees would 
allow them to continue to offer that product without facing the 
regulatory burdens of banks. 
Mutual fund companies, which sponsor roughly half of MMFs, 
would likely also find explicit sponsor guarantees unattractive for 
several reasons. First, although sponsors have historically provided 
support, the voluntary nature of this support provides sponsors with 
an exit option if that support should prove too costly, as it might, for 
example, in a situation such as the U.S. government defaulting on its 
debt. Second, many of the most powerful mutual funds have been 
successful in avoiding a substantial regulatory burden by persuading 
the SEC to exempt retail funds. Subjecting themselves to a support 
commitment would obviously be less attractive. Third, to the extent 
that they must face additional regulation, sponsors would likely prefer 
gates and fees, which allow them to transfer the costs of excessive 
risk-taking to their MMF investors rather than bear those costs 
themselves, as they would through a sponsor support requirement. 
A second objection might be that explicit sponsor guarantees are 
too costly. As noted above, one advantage of this Article’s proposal is 
that, because it offers sponsors a variety of mechanisms for meeting 
their obligations and does not mandate an explicit set-aside of capital, 
it will be less expensive to implement than an alternative such as a 
capital buffer.335 Nonetheless, the contingent liability associated with 
a guarantee, a standby letter of credit, or the purchase of illiquid 
assets (even if those assets will trade at par on maturity) becomes 
more costly as the size of an MMF grows. As a result, sponsor support 
may require a sponsor to limit the size of its MMFs to reduce its 
liability exposure. 
This Article does not view the prospect that sponsor support 
might impose a limit on MMF size as problematic; indeed, this might 
be viewed as an additional advantage of the proposal. If required 
sponsor support causes sponsors voluntarily to reduce MMF size, that 
action would reduce the systemic importance of any single MMF. Part 
of the contagion effect generated by the Reserve Fund’s failure was 
due to its size—$62.6 billion in assets.336 The resulting redemption 
 
 335. See 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,907 (rejecting required capital buffers, 
in part, due to their cost). 
 336. See Stecklow & Gullapalli, supra note 330. 
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requests created a need for the Reserve Fund to seek billions of 
dollars’ worth of liquidity and to attempt to sell a substantial quantity 
of securities into a weak credit market.337 If it is problematic for banks 
and other financial institutions to get too big, regulation that 
indirectly places a practical limit on MMF size seems at worst 
benign.338 Concededly, MMFs, like other mutual funds, do enjoy 
economies of size and scale, and funds would sacrifice those 
economies if they were limited in size. 
In addition, although financially sound sponsors with other 
substantial business operations, such as large mutual fund companies, 
could likely fund any support obligation through operating capital or 
other assets, sponsor support may be particularly burdensome for 
smaller sponsors or those that lack other businesses. Thus, explicit 
guarantees might have the effect of precluding certain types of 
sponsors from offering MMFs, either because they lack the assets to 
guarantee fund value or because the market would be skeptical of 
their ability to meet the support obligation. In retrospect, investors 
might be skeptical that the Reserve Management Company, “a stand-
alone fund company with almost no other funds under 
management,”339 would provide support to its MMFs. In contrast, 
investors might be more confident in relying on support from a 
company like Fidelity, which, in 2006 “sponsored 252 non-money 
market mutual funds with $814 billion in assets under 
management.”340 Sponsors with other businesses face the most 
spillover risk if their MMF is fragile and, accordingly, are likely to 
take steps to prevent that by reducing the riskiness of their MMF 
assets.341 Similarly, funds with substantial non-MMF assets are in a 
better position to provide support. 
Again, to the extent this reform has the effect of reducing the 
ability of financially compromised sponsors to offer MMFs, this 
Article views that effect as an advantage, not a weakness. Notably, 
explicit sponsor support changes the focus of market discipline by 
properly focusing investors on sponsor financial stability in evaluating 
 
 337. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text (describing the failure of the 
Reserve Fund). 
 338. In particular, some administrative expenses are more or less fixed regardless of 
fund size. See INV. CO. INST., 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK ch. 5 (2014), 
available at http://www.icifactbook.org/fb_ch5.html (describing mutual fund fees and 
expenses and noting economies of scale and size). 
 339. See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 52, at 11. 
 340. Id. 
 341. See id. at 3 (finding that “funds sponsored by financial intermediaries with more 
money fund business took on more risk”). 
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MMFs rather than on the MMF portfolio. As this Article argued 
earlier, the structure of MMFs makes direct investor monitoring of 
portfolio assets problematic. The portfolio’s assets are extremely 
short term, meaning that the quality of the portfolio can change 
rapidly. Portfolio assets are, in many cases, thinly traded and difficult 
to price. Finally, the MMF’s shadow prices tend to be stale and to 
incorporate future economic developments incompletely. In contrast, 
investors can readily monitor the financial condition of MMF 
sponsors and identify the business practices that provide economic 
incentives for sponsors to meet their support obligations. This more 
efficient investor monitoring is a distinctive advantage of this Article’s 
proposal. 
At the same time, this Article’s proposal would not preclude 
smaller and less stable sponsors from offering MMFs. Sponsors could 
address investors’ concerns about incentives and solvency through a 
variety of mechanisms including explicit guarantees, standby letters of 
credit, or purchasing insurance to cover their support obligations.342 In 
particular, insurance offers yet another mechanism for monitoring 
MMF risk, as insurance providers have an economic incentive to 
understand an MMF sponsor’s risk profile and tailor the cost and 
scope of coverage accordingly.343 Importantly, insurance for an 
individual sponsor’s MMF obligations would be quite different from 
industry-wide mandated insurance and would not create the same 
concerns about cost and moral hazard.344 On the other hand, the 
sponsor support requirement could operate as a barrier to entry for 
smaller potential sponsors, reducing competition in the industry. 
 
 342. Some MMFs purchased insurance from the ICI Mutual Insurance Company from 
1993 to 2003. See 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,905 (describing cost and coverage 
of mutual fund portfolio insurance). The ICI has expressed concern that, in today’s 
market, such insurance would either not be available or would be prohibitively expensive. 
See INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 113 (2009), 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf. It should be noted that insurance is 
available and currently used to ensure the stability of a comparable product—stable value 
funds. See Robert Steyer, Wrap Market Returns—But with Changes, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.pionline.com/article/20101213/PRINT/ 
101219979/wrap-market-returns-8212-but-with-changes# (describing use of stable value 
funds, in which price is maintained through insurance wraps in retirement accounts). 
 343. See Insurance in the US Market for Investment Companies and Related Entities, 
ICI, http://www.ici.org/pubs/white_papers/03_eu_insurance_paper (last visited Apr. 7, 
2015) (“The insurance obtained by investment companies tends to be closely matched to 
their risk profiles. The insurance company’s interest in the process fosters greater accuracy 
of insurance coverage.”). 
 344. Cf. 2013 Rule Proposal, supra note 9, at 36,911–12 (describing and rejecting 
proposal that MMFs be required to obtain some type of insurance). 
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Critics may also question whether sponsor support is sufficiently 
reliable. What happens, under this approach, if a sponsor defaults, as 
the Bents did?345 While mandatory sponsor support cannot eliminate 
the possibility, such a default would be no different from the failure of 
any financial institution to meet its obligations. Unlike the current 
system, however, investors would not face unpredictability about 
whether a sponsor would provide support because such support 
would be required rather than voluntary. In addition, an MMF 
sponsor that failed to meet its obligations would face the prospect of 
an enforcement action, not just the uncertain penalty of market 
discipline. As a result, solvent and financially responsible sponsors 
are unlikely to default, and, as described above, investors should have 
adequate information to identify and avoid sponsors that cannot 
credibly commit to support their funds. 
Finally, this Article’s proposal can be criticized on the basis that 
it would undermine the efficient asset partitioning that is a key 
component of the MMF structure.346 Sponsor support would make 
sponsor assets available to meet MMF shortfalls. Importantly, the 
interference with asset partitioning would be both limited and operate 
only in one direction. Sponsor assets would only be available to the 
extent necessary for the MMF to maintain a stable $1 NAV. 
Concededly, the added liability exposure of fund sponsors could be 
viewed as another justification for classifying investment managers as 
systemically important financial institutions or SIFIs.347 Whether it is 
appropriate for the FSOC to designate asset managers as SIFIs348 is a 
 
 345. It is unclear whether the Reserve Management Company was unable or unwilling 
to provide support for the Reserve Fund, but, as detailed in the SEC’s enforcement action, 
the defendants issued a number of public statements indicating that they intended to 
provide sponsor support—support that never materialized. See Complaint at 2–3, SEC v. 
Reserve Management Co. Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2009) (No. 09 CV 
4346). The SEC’s fraud case was based on the claim that, at the time the Bents made these 
promises, they had no intention of providing such support. Id. 
 346. See Morley, supra note 30, at 1240–41 (discussing the consequences of such 
separation). 
 347. In September 2013, the Office of Financial Research released a report produced 
at the request of the FSOC to enable the FSOC to consider whether asset managers 
should be considered for enhanced regulation as SIFIs. OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 
ASSET MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 1 (2013), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/ofr/research/Pages/AssetManagementFinancialStability.aspx [hereinafter OFR 
REPORT]. The OFR concluded that asset managers can “introduce vulnerabilities that 
could pose, amplify, or transmit threats to financial stability.” Id. 
 348. It is also conceivable that the FSOC could designate MMFs themselves as SIFIs. 
For a detailed analysis of why such a designation would not be appropriate, see Eric D. 
Roiter, Should Money Market Funds Be Designated as “SIFIs”?, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 749, 760 (2012) (“Treating money market funds as potential SIFIs posing systemic risk 
would thus distort the essential character of money market funds . . . .”). 
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controversial topic and beyond the scope of this Article,349 although it 
is worth noting that for the vast majority of asset managers, MMFs 
constitute a small percentage of their total assets under 
management.350 
In addition, MMF assets would not be available to meet the 
needs of a financially distressed sponsor. This segregation of MMF 
assets from sponsor assets provides the key value of asset partitioning 
in the mutual fund structure.351 The segregation is illustrated by the 
failure of Lehman. Notably, although Lehman’s bankruptcy brought 
down the Reserve Fund, it did not bankrupt Lehman’s own mutual 
funds. The assets of those funds were segregated by law and out of 
the reach of Lehman’s creditors.352 
CONCLUSION 
Since 2008, MMFs have been targeted for broad-based 
regulatory reform. Six years later, the SEC has adopted a rule that 
may have draconian consequences for some types of MMFs while 
failing to address core concerns about MMF stability. The limitations 
of the rule can largely be attributed to the flawed process by which it 
was produced and, in particular, the politics of MMF reform. In 
particular, by analogizing MMF redemptions to bank runs and 
debating proposed reforms on the basis of whether they will reduce a 
run risk to zero, policymakers have set an unrealistic objective for 
MMF reform and imposed a risk-reduction requirement far beyond 
that applicable to the banking industry. 
In addition, by painting MMFs as part of the shadow banking 
system, critics have overlooked the critical attribute that distinguishes 
MMFs from bank deposits—the structural separation of MMFs from 
their sponsors. This attribute provides the key to increased MMF 
 
 349. Both the report and the prospect that the FSOC could designate certain asset 
managers as SIFIs have generated considerable controversy. See, e.g., Emily Stephenson & 
Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Senators Slam Study on Systemic Risks Posed by Asset Managers, 
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/24/us-financial-
regulation-asset-idUSBREA0N1LG20140124 (noting claims that the study was flawed and 
could damage the Treasury Department’s reputation). 
 350. See OFR REPORT, supra note 347, at 20 (providing data for seven large asset 
managers). Federated Investors is an exception; its business consists primarily of 
institutional money market funds. Id. 
 351. See id. at 1 (contrasting the separation between asset management firms and the 
money they handle with banks and insurance companies that operate without that 
protection). 
 352. See Anne Kates Smith, What Happens to Lehman’s Customers?, KIPLINGER 
(Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T023-C000-S001-what-
happens-to-lehman-s-customers.html. 
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stability. The solution for reducing MMF fragility lies within MMFs 
themselves in the form of explicit sponsor support. Although existing 
law prevents sponsors from committing to maintain a $1 share price, 
this Article argues that such a commitment is desirable. It therefore 
proposes that MMF sponsors should be required to support the $1 
share price of their fixed NAV MMFs. 
Importantly, however, sponsor support should not be mandated 
through a rigid and costly vehicle such as capital buffers or mandatory 
insurance. MMF sponsors come in a variety of different shapes and 
sizes, and this variety offers a range of possible support mechanisms 
that take advantage of the sponsors’ reputations, outside assets, and 
overall business plans. As a result, sponsor support should be 
permitted through the range of mechanisms that have been used 
successfully throughout the history of the MMF, including fee 
waivers, guarantees, capital infusions, and the purchase of MMF 
securities at par. By mandating sponsor support, regulators can 
formalize existing support practices that have proved valuable in 
maintaining MMF stability while increasing the transparency of 
sponsor support to the market. 
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